FORUM

Vol. CXII No. 6

AMERICAN LEADERSHIP (I)

By ELLEN D. ELLIS

Professor Emeritus of Political Science
Mount Holyoke College

Political Realities

WHAT use will the people of the United States make of the leadership that fate has thrust upon them? Will they understand the direction of contemporary world forces with intelligence sufficient for the present crisis? Will they accept the challenge that history offers them? Will they assume leadership in the construction of a democratic world of the later twentieth century? Or, will they, as persistent victims of outworn clichés and stereotypes, allow leadership to pass to the forces of reaction?

The answer to this question must be sought and found in a study of the realities of political organization past and present. Political organization consists essentially in the utilization and organization of power relationships, with equal emphasis upon organization and power. In this fact lies the key, as yet undiscovered by many, to the most perplexing and most dangerous problems of the present time.

As far back as the records reach, men have at all times and in all places found it expedient and necessary to organize the actual physical force resident in the members of a specific group for the accomplishment of certain ends. In all political groups, however, underneath the more immediate and superficial purposes, there can be detected a common fundamental objective. This objective can best be expressed as the maintenance of law and order among the members of the group. And, shorn of all glamor, this simply means the enforced observance of the rules laid down by those members of the group who find themselves in a position to impose their will upon all the members of the group as a whole.

These are the rudimentary facts of all political groupings as history has revealed them. Historically, man has always sought law and order in these terms. The obvious reason lies in the fact that the recalcitrant in society have in most instances yielded more readily and more surely to forceful compulsion than to other forms of persuasion. If all men had been at all times perfectly wise and perfectly well-disposed towards their fellow men, perfect agreement as to ends and means would have prevailed among them. The "state" would not have appeared. Or if economic pressure or moral suasion had been sufficiently effective, political organization would not have been necessary.

Unfortunately these conditions have not prevailed. Everywhere recourse has been had, actually or potentially, to the sanction of force. Indeed, human experience has shown that without recourse to that sanction, even a modicum of law and order has not been possible. A most eloquent testimony to this fact was the Boston police strike of 1919. At that time a strike by the police of the city of Boston was accompanied by disorders which it required the state militia to quell. And, at the opposite pole of the world, Pandit Nehru, a devoted follower of Gandhi, has not found it possible to maintain the existing regime in India by methods of non-violence alone.

DRURY COLLEGE LIBRARY
Springfield, Missouri

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Certain warnings should be given here. To point out the above facts is not to maintain that the only motive operative upon most members of society is fear of corporal or capital punishment. Many considerations keep most of us in line with the requirements of the law. Most of us live out our lives without coming actively under the impositions of the penal code. It is only against the recalcitrant, i.e., against those who actively oppose the regulations of the existing order, that political and legal sanctions are actually brought to bear. Yet recalcitrancy has been a sufficiently significant factor to bring about political organization.

In the second place, to stress this characteristic of the state as that which marks it off from other forms of social organization is not to be oblivious of the "welfare state." It is to be remembered, however, that the reason why the state is progressively taking over functions and performing services hitherto performed by individuals for themselves, or by private organizations for their members, is that the state can through its coercive power levy upon the resources of its members, and thus support these services through taxation. Behind the welfare function of the state, in other words, lies forceful sanction, upon which the services of the state must always ultimately depend.

Nor do we hold that under all circumstances the maintenance of law and order by political means is justified in itself. To hold this would be to justify all the hideous manifestations of political power that history, and especially the twentieth century, have produced. Unless the ends sought and the means employed are consonant with justice for the individual in the widest sense—intellectual, spiritual, and material—political authority lays itself open to question and criticism.

The organization of power has taken on various forms at different times and in different places. Characteristic examples are the city states of the ancient world and those of Italy in late medieval and early modern times; the territorial states that emerged out of feudalism in Europe, culminating in the so-called "national" states of the modern period. In each of these units there was an organization of power that claimed to be, and in large part actually was, supreme over individuals and groups within the unit. This power rested in those members of the community who, for one reason or another, possessed the control of the major physical force resident in the community. This supreme power came to be known as sovereignty, the expressed and enforced will of the sovereign group being known and recognized as law.

As the national state system developed during the earlier modern centuries, the sovereignty claimed for the national state, necessarily took on an external as well as an internal aspect. Because, if the sovereign power in the state was to be supreme over everything within, it must be independent of everything outside. Only thus could internal sovereignty be maintained. The sovereign state was therefore understood to possess external independence, which became one of its most dearly cherished attributes.

If these claims for national sovereignty had been in reality valid, we should have seen a world divided into a number of airtight, self-sufficient compartments, each one within its own self-contained and self-containing political boundaries. Actually, this condition of things has not existed.

These "independent" entities known as states have, as a matter of fact, been anything but politically independent of one another. Notoriously, the smaller and less powerful among them have found it expedient to yield in practice to the will of the larger states. Competition for power has led to conflict, too frequently resulting in open war between greater and lesser powers alike.

The actual political interdependence of states has also been reflected in what has been known as international law. From earliest times, "independent" political units, finding themselves in necessary relationship with one another, have sought to regularize this relationship. This they have done through common acceptance of certain rules which they have recognized as binding upon them in their dealings with each other. To a certain extent, they have actually observed these rules. To them they have given the name International Law.

Whether the term "law" is rightly applicable to this body of recognized norms has

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

been one of the most controversial questions of modern times. The fact remains that each state has been in the last analysis interpreter for itself of the rules of international law. Where differences of interpretation have appeared, there has been no higher arbiter with power to enforce a decision.

An increasing interdependence rather than independence has also been the rule in the economic realm. The peoples of the single political units have, despite the "independence" of those units, needed and sought materials and commodities produced beyond their borders. All people everywhere have likewise needed, and sought to make use of, intellectual and scientific discoveries whereever they may have been made. Under strong local pressures within their borders, or in preparation for possible war, the national sovereign states have stepped in to regulate and restrict exchange with other peoples. In spite of this fact, however, the common need has persisted. Western Europe today presents a sorry picture of the results of national trade barriers and restrictions.

SCIENCE

The phenomenal development of science in the twentieth century has accentuated the interdependence of peoples in a spectacular manner. Whether these developments promise good or evil for humanity will depend upon how much political wisdom man can summon to meet the unprecedented problems of a technological age.

Improved methods of intercourse and communication have brought all parts of the earth to within flying distance of a few hours from each other. These scientific discoveries have, indeed, not only rendered the less advanced peoples increasingly dependent upon the more advanced. The more highly developed parts of the world have become increasingly dependent upon the less developed. What affects one region affects all regions in common. Successful subjugation by an aggressive state of an economically or strategically more vulnerable area inevitably reacts upon the well being and the security of areas far removed. Political boundaries are no longer significant in the earlier sense.

Lethal weapons of war—bacteriological cultures, poison gas, the atom bomb, aerial projectiles—overleap political boundaries, and no state can adequately protect itself or its people against their use. Discussion of the report of the Atomic Energy Commission of the United Nations has shown with convincing clarity that only by the control of manufacture at the source, entailing strict supervision and regulation by a supra-national body, could genuine protection be secured. Indeed, that discussion has for many been conclusive evidence that such a supra-national body would have to be clothed with more definitive and far reaching power than the Atomic Energy Commission as an organ of the United Nations was in a position to recommend for it.

Certain political ideologies of the twentieth century have, in setting forth their programs of political action, ignored the alleged independence of states and governments. Italian Fascism, German National Socialism, and Russian Communism have, as was pointed out earlier in these columns (see Ellen Deborah Ellis. "American Civil Rights in a Revolutionary Age. 1. Ideological Background." *Forum.* Volume CIX, Number 2. February, 1948, pp. 65 - 68.), preached the necessity of political action across state boundaries.

For these reasons, among countless others, the "national interest" of every people has been extending in constantly widening circles until it now embraces in reality the entire globe. The effective frontier of the United States has been moving steadily eastward, from the Atlantic seaboard across the Atlantic to the Rhine, as in World War II, and now past the Elbe to and beyond the Iron Curtain itself. Failure to recognize, or inability to defend our western frontier in Asia has contributed materially to the Communist absorption of China.

Yet we persist in formulating our policies within the frame of reference of our respective "national sovereignties." We still cling tenaciously to the idea of effective national boundaries, as if they in any sense reflected the realities of the situation with which the world is faced. To meet the profoundly world shaking problems presented by the scientific and political events of the twentieth century, each and every one of which problems has

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

emerged in and through complete disregard of the national sovereign state, we still have in effect only those "sovereign states." We are still concocting remedies exclusively in their name.

And the worst of it is that the hold over us of these outworn concepts and beliefs is so strong that we do not know how fantastic the role is that we are attempting to play. Surely we are living in an Alice-in-Wonderland-world, the only difference between us and Alice being that Alice was at least confused and perplexed by it all. We have not yet reached her state of enlightened perplexity.

The vanishing significance of political boundaries between the national sovereign states of the modern world is, however, only the negative side of the changing world pattern of the twentieth century. The picture has its positive side as well. And like all positive phenomena, this side is fraught with far greater potentiality for good or for ill than is true of the negative. Man, as well as nature, abhors a vacuum. With the disappearance of old political forms and relationships, new realities emerge to take their place.

The political process has been throughout history as widespread and as inevitable as life itself. Given human nature as it is, in this less than perfect world, social or economic interdependence tends always to assume political form.

To fill the void created by the disappearing effectiveness of old political boundaries, new concentrations of political power are taking place. In eastern Europe, and now in Asia, this reconcentration of power is recognized as the Soviet orbit. The political relationships within that orbit have become increasingly clear. No one now seriously doubts that the satellite states of Eastern Europe are ruled from Moscow. And many things point to the emergence of the same relationship between the U.S.S.R. and Communist China.

Though the European states have been subdued, not by the old method of international war, but by newer, twentieth century methods —the fifth column and the like—they are not less integral parts of the larger political entity that the Soviet Union dominates. So sinisterly calculated is the procedure followed by the U.S.S.R. that she carries it on in the name of the very "independence and sovereignty" she violates. While denouncing the "interventions" of the Western Powers, as in Greece, she has developed to perfection her technique of world revolution in the form of infiltration and guerrilla warfare backed always, though sometimes somewhat inconspicuously, by Russian arms. No one, except possibly the satellite states themselves, is fooled by Russian insistence that they still possess independence and sovereignty, even in a very qualified form. The rift between the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia has revealed beyond a shadow of a doubt Russian claims to supremacy and control. Whether out of that rift will evolve a new pattern of power is as yet too early to predict.

In the West, where United States hegemony exists, a different pattern prevails. The relations between the United States and those states in Europe and Asia which require her economic assistance—and which she finds it in her interest to assist—are not as yet politically formalized. The political implications of those relationships are however not less real on that account.

The economic predominance of the United States places the essentials of political power in her hands. The unanswered question is: Will the United States by continuing to give lip service to the outworn shibboleths of national sovereignty end up, as the Russians allege she is already doing, by establishing a precarious new imperialism over dependent units? Or will she assume the better role, and take the lead in the task of devising newer, more stable, and more comprehensive democratic forms calculated to meet the newer realities as they exist? (Miss Ellis will complete this discussion next month.)

A spiritual work published in London under Puritan auspices in the seventeenth century bore this title: "The Spiritual Mustard-Pot, to Make the Soul Sneeze with Devotion."—*Irish Catholic*

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The underlying reasons

BRITAIN'S COURSE OF DECLINE

By RAYMOND G. COWHERD

Associate Professor of History, Lehigh University

THE twentieth century has witnessed a sharp decline in the world-wide economic leadership of Great Britain. This decline has been in part the decadence which all Europe has suffered as a consequence of the destruction of two world wars. It has resulted also from the increasing wealth and power of the United States.

Great Britain was the ascendant power of Europe during the last half of the nineteenth century. Its influence penetrated the remote places of the world and the pattern of its development, industrial and imperial, was adopted by other nations desiring to add cubits to their stature. Indeed, the nations recently unified and feeling the throb of nationalism—Germany, Italy, and Japan—soon began to rival the teacher.

The foundations of supremacy achieved by England during the reign of Queen Victoria seemed secure enough. They reached deep into the earth and rested upon the solid strata of coal and iron. These minerals were the elements of industrial greatness, and their manufactured products, by reaching the markets of the world first, had an advantage over other national competitors. The channels of trade had long been opened by adventurous merchants and protected by an unchallenged navy.

The British role in economic affairs during the twentieth century has been affected by her changing conditions of wealth and population. During most of the nineteenth century her population was growing at a rate to give assurance that there would be sufficient manpower to maintain her position among the great nations of Europe. But by the end of the century the abnormal growth in British population had ceased. The annual birth rate steadily diminished from 1870 to 1900 and continued downward to the outbreak of World War I. According to the last census before the war, the populations of the great powers had reached these magnitudes: United States, 91.7 million; Germany, 64.9 million; United Kingdom, 45.3 million (including 4.39 million for Ireland), and France, 39.6 million. After World War I the birth rate in Britain continued to fall. This declining population, when considered in terms of military strength and industrial manpower, revealed that Great Britain, by the outbreak of World War II, was declining relative to the United States and Germany.

More significant than the decrease in population has been the relative decline of British industrial productivity. During the twentieth century Great Britain has produced less and less of the world's total wealth. By the end of the nineteenth century, both Germany and the United States had achieved an industrial capacity greater than that of Great Britain. In 1880 Britain produced one-third of the world's supply of steel and iron, but in 1900 this proportion had been reduced to one-seventh of the total supply. In the latter year Germany greatly surpassed British production of steel and the United States produced more than twice the tonnage produced by the British. During the twentieth century Britain became an importer rather than an exporter of steel.

Another basic industry was coal. This was the keystone of Britain's economic progress. By 1900 the United States was producing more coal. Lancashire cotton remained the largest item of British export trade. The countries of Europe and the United States, however, were building their own cotton industries behind tariff walls. As early as 1900

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

it was becoming increasingly clear that Britain had reached the zenith of her industrial expansion. By 1913 it had become apparent that the rate of progress was slower than that in Germany and the United States.

A new technology had emerged by 1900 which continued to be of increasing importance during the subsequent decades. Britain had obtained superiority in the older technology founded upon the use of coal, iron, and steam. The newer technology employed electricity and petroleum, the dynamo and the internal combustion engine. In these new developments England lagged behind because her technical education was inadequate and business leaders, who had vested interests in the older forms of industry, were reluctant to change to newer enterprises.

FREE TRADE

Britain's declining role in economic affairs has been connected with the failure of free trade at home and the triumph of protection abroad. The doctrine of free trade, a cardinal tenet in the creed of nineteenth century liberalism, triumphed in 1846 with the repeal of the Corn Laws. But it became evident at the beginning of the twentieth century that other nations would not accept the principle of free trade. In fact, Germany, France, and the United States had granted protection to their manufacturers, and even the self-governing colonies were building tariff walls against British commodities. The United States raised its walls of protection higher and higher by the McKinley tariff of 1891 and the Dingley tariff of 1897. The formation of the German cartels and the American holding companies, such as the United States Steel, inaugurated a policy of price fixing at home and the dumping of manufactured goods abroad. Under these conditions leaders of the Conservative Party, having serious misgivings about free trade, began to advocate a policy of protection for Great Britain.

Joseph Chamberlain was the most brilliant exponent of protection in the Conservative Party. He proposed the formation of an economic union which would hold together the various parts of the empire. A preference would be shown the colonies by allowing their products to enter England without paying duties levied upon the goods of foreign nations. By this plan Chamberlain hoped to draw Canada and the West Indies more closely to England and to prevent the identifying of their economic interests with those of the United States. He intended also to block the dumping of German goods on English markets. Although rejected in 1903 by the Conservative government and the majority of the electorate, Chamberlain's plan for protection gained wide acceptance throughout the country. The new movement, by carrying a majority of the Conservative press and by wining the support of the Fabian Socialists, achieved a complete triumph in 1931 when it was adopted as a national and imperial policy.

The destructiveness of total war was a more decisive factor than the failure of free trade. England, like other nations, was overwhelmed by a series of economic crises after World War I. Immediately after the end of hostilities, there ensued a period of prosperity characterized by the phenomena of high prices, full employment, and intensive production. During the period of high prices, while wages were lagging behind, a series of strikes won higher wages and shorter hours for labor. The boom collapsed in 1920 and economic paralysis reduced the entire country to stagnation. Prices fell from 175 per cent of the prewar level to 99 per cent in the closing month of 1920. They continued to decline in 1921 until they reached 79 per cent of the price level in 1914. Keeping pace with the downward spiral of prices, unemployment reached a total of two million. Prime Minister Lloyd George, attempting to alleviate suffering, increased the grants from unemployment insurance and gave dole to those persons not covered by insurance. Such measures, however, did not retrieve prosperity.

Foreign trade failed to revive. The nation of shop-keepers had ruined their best customers in war. Hostility and suspicion were not the ingredients of a flourishing trade with Russia and Germany. Too late, after the depression had slowed the wheels of production, England manifested a conciliatory spirit toward her foreign foes. Lloyd George endeavored to reopen the channels of trade by adopting a more lenient policy toward Germany and by negotiating a trade treaty with

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the new Communist government of Russia.

The plight of the basic industry of coal characterized the condition of the national economy. Owing to the recent developments in, and the extensive use of, oil and electricity, foreign markets were closing their doors on coal. This slackened demand was aggravated by German reparations. On the continent coal from the Ruhr supplanted English coal. All factors combined reduced the demand for coal in 1924 to three million tons less than the average for the five pre-war years. According to the report of a royal commission on the coal industry, there were 300,000 workers unemployed in June, 1925, and the entire industry was faced with virtual bankruptcy. Stagnation in the coal industry was felt by the merchant marine and nearly all agencies of commerce and transportation. Coal continued to be a potent cause of Britain's weakened position in the changing pattern of world trade and industrialization.

Britain emerged from the destruction of World War I as a debtor nation. The title of world banker crossed the Atlantic to the United States. London paid interest to New York, where previously dividends on foreign investments had been gathered. War, "the mad orgie of unproductive expenditure," had compelled the conversion of foreign assets into cash for the purchase of munitions.

Was this decline in British economy permanent? Undoubtedly World War I was a a source of many economic troubles. It also aggravated those long-run conditions which caused Britain's decreasing importance in international trade and world affairs. The decline in the volume of exports, during the period 1919-39, should be attributed in part to the failure to make technological progress. The leading exporter in 1913, Britain had only 10.86 per cent of total exports in 1929 as compared with 15.77 per cent for the United States. Meanwhile British imports steadily increased. Because of these twin factors the balance of international payments remained critical.

Britain's grave financial crisis of 1947-49 was a direct consequence of World War II. During the war $4.5 billion of foreign assets were sold and $11.6 billion of foreign liabilities were acquired to make a total "foreign disinvestment" of more than $16 billion. Loss of overseas investments reduced Britain's ability to buy those foreign goods needed to feed its population and restore its economy. Although Britain was the major recipient of Lend-Lease ($30 billion of the $46 billion went to the British Empire), an additional post-war loan of $3.75 billion was exhausted by the end of 1947. Very soon it was necessary to extend further aid through the Marshall Plan if the purchase of needed American supplies was to continue.

Destruction suffered during World War II was exceedingly great. It has been estimated that four million houses were destroyed or severely damaged and that one-third of the national capital was consumed during the years of conflict. The war budget for one year only, 1943, was greater than the entire national income of 1940. Such enormous costs of war have gravely aggravated the long-run economic decline.

This economic crisis was felt suddenly throughout the world September 18, 1949, when Britain devalued the pound sterling. It was reduced in value from $4.03 to $2.80 or 30.5 per cent. Some immediate consequences of this change in currency have appeared. The British consumer must pay more for his bread made from American flour, while the consumer in the United States pays less for his British-made automobile. To gain the same number of dollars as she previously earned, Britain must increase the shipment of goods to the United States. Because Britain's production cannot greatly increase, its standard of living must fall.

The revaluation of the pound should not, therefore, be considered a solution of the economic maladies that have afflicted England since the First World War. It only indicates dramatically the imbalance of international payments, despite the generous gifts of the United States under the Marshall Plan. It shows vividly the failure of Britain's production to keep pace with that of the United States. As a consequence of the long-run economic decline of Great Britain, the United States must now assume an ever increasing role in world affairs.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Economics of The Welfare State

By LAURENCE DE RYCKE

Associate Professor of Economics
Occidental College

Security or opportunity?

THIS is an exploratory essay. It must, of necessity, be such because the term "the welfare state" like "the free enterprise system" appears to mean different things to different people. An examination of the large and growing literature on the subject indicates the nature of the welfare state. It is closely associated with governmental assumption of responsibility for the individual's economic security. It seems to include the idea that the state knows what the individual's needs are and is best equipped to provide for them. There is surely no unanimity of opinion as to how this concept can or should be implemented.

Of course the basic concept of economic security for the individual is far from self explanatory. For example, does it imply the property right of an individual in a particular job in a specific firm, with the assumption that that firm will always be in operation? Or does it mean that an individual has a right to earn a livelihood somewhere within a defined market? The difference is important. If the latter is meant, then we can expect the welfare state to support the maintenance of the market, price, profit, opportunity, or enterprise type of economy in which individual initiative is primarily relied upon to satisfy consumer demand. If the former is meant, then almost surely we can look forward to the growth of monopoly, encouraged by government, as the chosen economic instrument for satisfying consumer demand. Once this decision has been made, we will be confronted, almost surely, with the alternative of becoming a fascist or a socialist state —and it is entirely possible that a free choice will not be ours to make.

Obviously this is a large and involved question that cannot be explored in detail in a single essay. Emphasis here will be placed on the question of monopoly versus free enterprise as an effective economic institution for satisfying consumer demand. It is the writer's belief that much of what has been said in favor of the "welfare state" has been said in innocence of the results which are reasonably sure to follow. While freedom of choice is still open to us we should face this decision with at least some of the pertinent facts before us and with our eyes open.

The world today is experiencing an economic, political, and scientific revolution which, in intensity and scope, is without parallel in history. There have been other revolutions in years gone by, however, which were less important in a relative sense only. In its time and place sequence in history, for example, the revolution of 1776 was just as important. It most surely was so to the people of that time. The revolution of 1776 is epitomized by the American Declaration of Independence, the first successful steam engine, and Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*. It was no accident that all three appeared at about the same time. They were all products of what students of history and philosophy refer to as "The Age of Reason." They were just as revolutionary in their day as the atomic bomb, imperialistic Russian communism, and the concept of the welfare state are today.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Like the offspring of "The Age of Reason," these modern developments have a common heritage. Accepting in advance the criticism of oversimplification, some of the basic components of this heritage are the logical development of the Industrial Revolution and the fact that businessmen in America and elsewhere have been more interested in profits than in preserving the system which produced the profits. They have not always played the game of capitalism according to the rules.

REGULATION

Government regulation, control, supervision, and security for the individual are nothing new. They are as old as the institution of government. Perhaps at no time in the recorded history of man did the individual have greater social, economic, and perhaps political security than during the Middle Ages. During the centuries of that period a person was born into a particular social stratum with almost no possibility of escape. In many instances he was prohibited from changing his occupation. In reality, he was not an individual at all, but an integral component of a well organized society. An active force in erecting and maintaining the system was the universal church. The reward was security.

It was the regulation of economic activity by the state, which later developed into what is now termed "mercantilism", against which Adam Smith directed some of the most scathing polemics in all literature. He challenged the basic assumption that the state was more important than the individual and that the state knew best what was good for an individual. Basing his reasoning on the assumption that everyone has something of the Scotchman in him (the advantages of which leave room for argument), Smith maintained that each individual is the best judge of his own best interests. To have ended the reasoning there might easily have resulted in the advocacy of anarchism. But Smith went further. He presented a device for marrying the interests of the individual and the group. Oversimplified, his argument went thus. Let each individual concentrate on producing that commodity or service for which he has the greatest aptitude. The result of this specialized production will be the largest possible supply of goods and services available for consumption.

Specialized production is merely another way of saying that in an economic community of specialists, each person is dependent upon all others because he no longer produces all things which he requires or desires. If each specialized producer then sells his product in a freely competitive market, competition will drive the price down to the lowest possible level consistent with satisfying effective consumer demand. Only the most efficient producers will remain in operation since only they can produce at lowest unit cost. More and more goods, of better and better quality, of greater and greater variety, for more and more people, at cheaper and cheaper prices will be produced. This, argued Smith, is the legitimate goal of economic activity.

Smith's system contains several elements that are of importance to an understanding of the free enterprise system and of the economics of the welfare state. It is not the law of the jungle. It does not force the strong to prey on the weak. It does not stifle man's natural instinct to cooperate. The success of the entire system depends upon the willingness of specialized producers to recognize that the maximum benefits of production can be enjoyed by all only through *unrestricted* exchange. The material well-being of the consumer is the be-all and end-all of the system. Any price is too high that can be reduced. All members of the economic community are both producers and consumers. Production creates and distributes the purchasing power necessary to enable consumers to buy the goods and services produced by the production process. Raw materials, capital, and labor combined by management into the most efficient pattern produces the largest amount of goods and services available for consumption out of the least amount of raw materials, time, effort, and resources. Cooperation between all of these factors of production is the oil which makes the capitalist machine run smoothly. Strife and friction is sand in the gears. Economic and political freedom are inseparably intertwined. The

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

game of capitalism, for which Smith and his followers drew up the rules, provides an ideal environment within which the individual may find an opportunity to release his basic psychic drives. At the same time, it directs the results of these drives into channels which redound to the material advantage of society in general.

The opponents of the capitalist system are eager to point out that the system looks fine on paper, but that nowhere for any considerable period of time has the entire system ever been put into practice. They will note that what we have today, and what existed in this country and elsewhere a hundred years ago, is not pure capitalism but a modification of it. And, they will note, the modified system was approved, in part, even by some of the founders of classical economics, because their natural humanitarian inclinations rebelled at the social conditions which capitalism produced.

The basic truth of these accusations cannot be successfully contested. The best informed of the critics have studied their history carefully and, in this instance, they are right. The social conditions resulting from the Industrial Revolution in Britain, Belgium, the United States, and elsewhere, present a sordid and grisly picture for which there is no satisfactory explanation other than some men's ignorance or greed.

But having admitted the truth of these accusations, we have solved no problems. Consumer demands for food, clothing, shelter, and amusement must still be satisfied somehow. To damn a method of satisfying these demands as productive of more social injustice than economic benefit is a judgment passed on an economic system and its practitioners. It is not a solution to consumer demand. The advocates of any other system must demonstrate that their system will remedy the deficiencies of capitalism without destroying its benefits. It is the argument of this paper that increased efforts to make the free enterprise system work, to play the game of capitalism according to the rules, will result in greater material benefit for consumers *and* more healthful social conditions than any system of regulation which has yet been advanced.

To substantiate that contention and to argue the case effectively, it is necessary to be quite certain about what we want from our economic system. A careful reading of some of the technical and much of the popular discussion of the subject has convinced the writer that security, defined as opportunity for an individual to provide himself and his family with the necessities and an expanding number of the comforts of life, continuously, during his productive years and during old age, is an important, but not the exclusive economic objective of most Americans. We want other things as well. For example, we still want an opportunity to "better ourselves." We want our children to have a chance, through their own efforts, to gain more of the good things of life than we had. We want an opportunity to help decide who is going to run the country and how. We want the right to stand up and say so, without fear of penalty, if things are not going the way we think they should go. In other words, we want *both* security *and* opportunity.

It is unlikely that anyone will be able to convince any considerable number of Americans within the forseeable future that absolute social and economic security—and stratification, because that is an inevitable part of the security pattern—is worth the sacrifice of opportunity. Of course, the case will not be put as bluntly as that. No one can guarantee absolute security, except within the framework of the institutions of the Middle Ages—and few Americans would accept that. But there is an effective argument to be made, that if security is emphasized, and the price of security is not constantly reiterated, too many unthinking people will be led to believe that it can be had merely by changing a system at no sacrifice whatever. It is important to realize that absolute economic and social security and complete economic and social freedom are incompatible objectives.

Is our present system—our American economic system as it is operating in the winter of 1950—the best possible system for achieving the greatest possible measure of security and opportunity for all Americans? This writer does not think so. One reason for

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

this personal judgment is, in part, the large and growing mass of evidence that the American economic machine is not being run for the primary benefit of the consumer. The specter of the giant corporation monopolizing a market for some much needed or desired commodity or service and reaping huge profits for a favored few stockholders is an oft repeated and greatly exaggerated story. But the most recent Federal Trade Commission report, to cite but one example, presents abundant evidence that concentration of economic power in American industry does exist and that the American consumer had best keep a wary eye on it in order to protect his own interests.

Another reason is the conviction that American management and labor are much more interested in securing a larger cut for themselves out of the production pie which is the product of their joint efforts, than in serving the American consumer. If examples are necessary, let the reader ask himself if he seriously believes that in any major strike in this country in recent years either management or labor was motivated primarily by concern for the welfare of the consumer.

These considerations are vital to the question under discussion here. If the economic system is not automatically providing for the welfare of the consumer—who is? If the consumer independently is not in a position to compel management and labor to regard his interests as primary objectives, he can achieve this objective only through the agency of government.

How did such a situation arise? That is an involved story, but some of the elements of it are clear. It is important, in the first place, to recognize that technological advance, rigid costs, social security, relative labor immobility, minute specialization, and the other well-known components of our modern economic system are the logical outgrowth of the Industrial Revolution and are here to stay. They have destroyed, in part, the earlier conception of the freely competitive market where costs were flexible, units of production small, and the businessman could be assumed to have perfect knowledge of the market. Such a situation never did exist completely. Today, in all likelihood, it is characteristic of not more than one half of the American market.

There is a large and growing area of "natural" monopoly. Transportation and communication have long been classic examples of "natural" monopolies—industries where competition is a less effective institution for rendering maximum service to the consumer than is monopoly—regulated in the public interest by the state. The list of such industries is expanding. It is arguable that it should expand faster and farther than is now actively advocated. Here is one reason why. For a number of years it has not been possible for railroad employees to stop service without complying with provisions of law enacted by Congress. But Mr. John L. Lewis can and does curtail the production of coal, almost at will, despite legal attempts to restrict his activities. The point of the example is that coal is the major source of fuel used by American railroads. Thus Mr. Lewis is able to do by indirection what the railroad employees or employers may not do directly. Numerous examples equally obvious could be cited to demonstrate the high degree of integration which is now the very essence of our American economy and the irreparable injury which is done the American consumer when *any* interruption in service or production occurs. Sooner or later, the right of *anyone* to suspend the production of essential goods or services for *any reason whatever* may have to be forfeited —in the public interest.

Is there a solution to this problem? Yes, but not one that can be painted white or black. It is fruitless to argue that the solution lies in a return to the classical conception of the free competitive market. It never did exist completely, and it is arguable that to establish it now would mean to give up most of the benefits of modern industrial production techniques. What we have in America today is a market composed of areas which run the gamut from near-free competition to near-complete monopoly. It is important that we recognize this existing state of economic affairs. What is here advocated is that the competitive system be maintained in all areas where it can be demonstrated to work to the best interest of the consumer, by government fiat if necessary.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Books in brief

JASPER R. LEWIS

The B.B.C. listener was treated to a rare experience last year which might well make his American cousin envious. It is difficult to imagine any event in American commercial radio comparable to the series of six lectures delivered over the English radio by that eminent social philosopher, Bertrand Russell.

These lectures have been collected into a thin volume entitled *Authority and the Individual* (Simon & Schuster, $2.00). Throughout recorded history one central problem has plagued philosophers and political scientists. This thorny issue—the limits of state and institutional authority and the limits of individual action—will, like death and taxes, be with us always. It is to this problem that Russell has turned his brilliant mind and lucid style. His clarity cuts like a machete through the jungle of such popular shibboleths as the welfare state, free enterprise, statism, private initiative, and selfish interests.

The book states the problem thus: "How can we combine that degree of individual initiative necessary for progress with the degree of social cohesion necessary for survival?" In his discussion there is little solace for proponents of either big business or big government. It is doubtful if any present-day ideology will unreservedly take the author to its bosom, although all, by judicious selection, can find arguments to bolster their respective causes.

Mr. Russell is not one to believe that the less government, the better. He maintains that with the cold war, the demands of populations everywhere for a minimum of social security, and the strivings of men for justice and freedom, strong governments are here to stay. He conceives of the primary aims of government as security, justice, and conservation, three objectives which he feels only the state can achieve.

But Russell, a vigorous advocate of strong social security programs, deplores the fetish of security per se.

> Security by itself is a negative aim inspired by fear; a satisfactory life must have a positive aim inspired by hope. This sort of adventurous hope invites risk and therefore fear. But fear deliberately chosen is not such an evil thing as fear forced upon a man by outward circumstances. We cannot therefore be content with security alone, or imagine that it can bring the millennium.

Like security, justice is a principle subject to limitations. The doctrine of political justice is so universally accepted in Western countries that there is little argument on that score. Today economic justice is an integral part of most political doctrines, and this requires a much greater amount of government control. Russell maintains that it even requires state ownership of key industries and considerable regulation of foreign trade. The dangers inherent in a policy pursuing economic justice are well known. All are economically equal in a society of slaves.

> There is justice where all are equally poor as well as where all are equally rich. . . . The case against justice is even stronger if, in the pursuit of equality, it is going to make even the poor poorer than before. And this might well happen if a general lowering of education and a diminution of fruitful research were involved. If there had not been economic injustice in Egypt and Babylon, the art of writing would never have been invented. There is, however, no *necessity,* with modern methods of production, to perpetuate economic injustice in industrially developed nations in order to promote progress in the arts of civilization.

Opposed to the duties of the state, as Russell conceives them, is the position of the individual. He maintains that in the majority of persons there exists an adventurous spirit,

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

an urge for excitement, and these urges have accounted for the progress of civilization. Too much security, too much control will, at the very least, quench the lust for life, the joy of living and creating. "Too little liberty brings stagnation, and too much brings chaos." If man's inherent desires for risks, creativeness, and excitement are frustrated by the state or large private organizations, individuals will either develop warped personalities or will seek such outlets as criminal activities or war. Wide scope must also be left for the exceptional individual, the man who is scorned in his own age and revered by future generations.

How then must we define the respective sphere of authority and initiative? Russell declares that on the one hand we have impulses to hold what we possess and, all too often, to acquire the possessions of others. On the other hand, we have creative impulses which put into the world something which is not taken away from others. Governments must therefore control the predatory instincts, but it must be careful not to stifle the largely unregulated impulses which give life its savor and value.

It must be confessed that Russell is more successful in his diagnosis than he is with his prescription. In brief, he would leave to smaller political bodies all functions which do not prevent the larger bodies from fulfilling their purposes. Thus a world government would have only such powers as are necessary to prevent war. (This, however, could mean considerable interference with internal affairs, for example, the problem of controlling nuclear energy.) The national government would leave as much as possible to the states, and the states to the cities. Thus government is brought closer to the individual. He has a chance to participate in political affairs and give scope to his creative instincts. One feels that the problem of parcelling out functions of social control to world, national, and local governments will be immeasurably more difficult than Russell estimates.

It is too bad that the book is so brief. Many of the issues and concepts are too complex to be discussed in a paragraph. But this is a minor objection to a volume that, in the heat of today's passions, is refreshing for its moderation, its ability to return to first principles, and its sane, realistic discussion of freedom and authority.

Descending from the tidy, impersonal sphere of theoretical political science to the down-to-earth, personal level is Raymond Moley's *27 Masters of Politics* (Funk & Wagnalls Company, $3.50).

This volume should properly be titled "Interesting Persons I Have Known." The term "master politician" seems somewhat inappropriate when applied to such men as Charles Michelson, Will Woodin, or Samuel Seabury. Equally noticeable are the omissions. Moley has a good chapter on Robert Moses, but nothing on The Little Flower. There is Byrnes, but nothing on Hull. And what about Vandenberg, Taft, Hopkins, or Ickes, to mention a few? Most notable by its absence is any discussion of the man who last November proved himself the master of them all.

As a collection of profiles on people with whom Moley has come in contact, the book makes fascinating, if not profound, reading. With an average of but 10 pages to each sitter, the artist can do little but use hurried brush strokes. It is therefore amazing that the portraits are so well done, and that many of the lines in the faces are new. Whether all will agree that the portraits are life-like is questionable, but at least they are worth looking at.

It is a shame that Moley allows his acute dislike of Roosevelt to mar the excellent balance of the book. He is sympathetic and understanding when discussing the foibles of others (even Huey Long is given the benefit of the doubt), and by doing so he succeeds in making these men seem very human and likeable. But when discussing F.D.R., which he does throughout most of the book, Moley gleefully pounces on each flaw as proof of the subject's duplicity and weak character. But at least Moley did place him among the top 27. On second thought, however, this degree of "M.P." might not mean too much, since Moley also confers it upon Charles Beard and Henry Wallace.

Mary Katharine Hammond

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BRIEFER COMMENT

POLITICAL

The Country of the Blind, by George S. Counts and Nucia Lodge (Houghton, Mifflin, $4.00), is a remarkably clear exposition of the Soviet Government, its people and their goals. It describes each weapon of propaganda—art, literature, music—and every possible means of extending Communist power. It does not minimize the threat. Rather it hopes for two competing worlds living in at least partial peace.

Operation Survival, by William H. Hessler (Prentice-Hall, $3.00), is a blunt survey of the world position, with some proposed war strategy in case it comes to World War III. Hessler does not think atomic bombs will win it. Neither does he think America can lift the backward Orient into prosperity. He poses some thoughtful questions on today's chief problem, Russia, and on our program of preparedness.

England today as seen by a former American is the subject of *No Cause for Alarm,* by Virginia Cowles (Harper, $3.75). The author describes with great respect the leading political figures—Churchill, Bevin, Cripps. Royalty too is lauded, and so is the Socialist regime. According to this report, the battle for England's recovery is not quite won, but is going according to plan. Fear ye not, . . . !

The Europe of Metternich and Disraeli is discussed in *Conservatism Revisited,* The Revolt Against Revolt, by Peter Viereck (Scribner, $2.50). In an excellently plain little book Professor Viereck points out the liberal aspects of yesterday's conservatism, as exemplified by the Hapsburg minister. *Forum* printed an excerpt from these essays in August, 1949.

This I Do Believe, by David E. Lilienthal (Harper, $2.50), is the credo of the former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. It is also by way of a summation of American education, policies and politics, and comparisons with Russian affairs. Lilienthal has some carefully weighed ideas, including the novel one that there should be a scheme of limited public service by rotation of our qualified citizens.

The reminiscenses of Eleanor Roosevelt during her husband's presidency make exceptionally interesting reading. *This I Remember* (Harper, $4.50), tells her story of family and official life. While distinctly personal, there are so many comments on important people and events that the book is a valuable part of the historical record. Mrs. Roosevelt appraises many of the characters; it is noted that she considered Jim Farley a real friend.

BIOGRAPHY

Selecting a number of comments and opinions, and analyzing and discoursing upon their meaning, Harry Emerson Fosdick portrays *The Man from Nazareth* (Harper, $3.00), through the eyes of Christ's contemporaries. It is less religious than biographical and inspirational, written in a reverential and reserved style.

Leap to Freedom, by Oksana Kasenkina (Lippincott, $3.00), is the explanation of the Russian woman who jumped from the New York Soviet Consulate last year and eventually was rescued by authorities from the tender ministrations of the Russian officials. The author tells also of her early life in Russia, her husband's experiences and disappearance, and much of Soviet official life and practices.

Out of the daily newspaper columns and other writings of the late humorist comes *The Autobiography of Will Rogers,* edited by Donald Day (Houghton, Miffiin, $3.00). Rogers' material always in a direct personal vein, lends itself admirably to a continuous story, and Day makes an excellent, heartwarming job of it.

John Milton, Englishman, by James Holly Hanford (Crown, $3.75), is a biography combining the chronicle of the poet's life with an interpretation of his works. There is naturally considerable English history of the period. The poems, particularly the *Paradise* books, are given detailed analysis.

The Story of Language, by Mario Pei (Lippincott, $5.00), may be called the romance of words. Dr. Pei discusses the inception and growth of language in a comprehensive way, going into origins, evolutions, and innovations. His final appeal for a universal language—any one—is impressively

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

simple. Start teaching it now world-wide, especially to children, and within a century it will be *the* language.

The five Doolittle fliers who were interned in 1942 in Russia were not abused nor maltreated, and certainly were not pampered by their unwilling hosts. *Guests of the Kremlin,* by Lt. Col. Robert G. Emmens (Macmillan, $3.00), tells the story informally and plainly. As one of the five, Emmens reflects the austerity of daily life for the masses, and his cordial hatred of communism. The story of the year's sojourn and the escape is both enlightening and amusing.

Turning from fiction, Thomas B. Costain popularizes history in *The Conquerors* (Doubleday, $4.00), which narrates the story of England from 1066 to 1216, in the first of five volumes on "the Pageant of England." It is history, with the accent on human drama and tragedy, in a fascinating presentation.

The inception and development of picture making as a means of transferring thoughts is recorded graphically in *From Cave Painting to Comic Strip,* by Lancelot Hogben (Chanticleer Press, $5.00). With several hundred illustrations (some in color) and interesting text, it covers the "history of human communications" to date.

W. Somerset Maugham jotted down notes, thoughts, and opinions on people and things for nearly sixty years, for possible use in his writings. *A Writer's Notebook* (Doubleday, $4.00), is the rich autobiographical result, made up as it is of epigrams, reminiscences of famous people, and comments on art, letters, and travel.

Conditioned Reflex Therapy, by Andrew Salter (Creative Age, $3.75), is the author's theories and experiences as a psychotherapist, particularly directed against the psychoanalysis of Freudian disciples. With some of his own case histories, he interests the reader in his views on emotions and inhibitions, and his treatment of patients suffering from various forms of such difficulties.

Arthur Koestler tells the story of the State of Palestine in *Promise and Fulfilment.* Palestine 1917-1949 (Macmillan, $4.00). There are the historical events prior to the birth of the nation, the Jewish war of independence, and the present state of affairs, together with the mode of living as seen by an ardent Zionist.

Curtain Time, by Ruth Harvey (Houghton, Mifflin, $3.00), is a pleasant book of the author's recollections of early theatrical days in Canada. Her father was the operator of the "Bread Basket Circuit' in Manitoba, and her mother a former actress, so that comments on the plays and players of yesteryear come naturally.

Theatre World, edited by Daniel Blum (Greenberg, $3.50) gives the pictorial and statistical record of the 1948-49 Broadway theatrical season. With pictures, the cast, and brief synopsis, it gives individual facts on each production. It is the fifth annual of this publication.

Mark Hanna gives some good pointers and some examples of the whys and wherefores in *Public Speaking Without Fear and Trembling* (Macmillan, $2.75). Some of his advice is just as usable in writing and reporting, and while some of it is simply the old and tried rules, Hanna points the way to an easy understanding of them.

Told in terms of native forests, some of the pioneering adventures in American history are related in *American Heartwood,* by Donold Culross Peattie (Houghton, Mifflin, $3.50), from the early Norsemen to the trail west. Facts blended with fancy, all revolving around our woodlands, make a novel, pleasant presentation.

Redwood Country, by Alfred Powers (Duell, Sloan & Pearce, $3.50), is the history of the lava region and the redwoods on our Pacific Coast. In with informative notes on the trees and the land are tales and records of the people who first explored and adventured. It is an American Folkways Book.

The chemistry of the soil is explained for the farmer and the amateur grower in *Make Friends With Your Land,* by Leonard Wickenden (Devin-Adair, $2.50). Organic agriculture, or organiculture as the author calls it, utilizes natural fertilizers, organic matter, and earthworms and dislikes commercial chemical fertilizers and sprays. This might be an important angle for growers and economists.

Sheila Kaye-Smith and G. B. Stern offer further essays on the world and writings of

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Jane Austen in *More About Jane Austen* (Harper, $3.50). There are a dozen chapters, six by each author, with name indicated. Some of them are discussions of an individual book and its characters; all of them are indicative of the pleasure experienced in reading Jane Austen's novels.

Ira R. T. Smith spent 50 years opening presidential mail in the White House, from McKinley to Truman. *"Dear Mr. President"*, written with Joe Alex Morris (Messner, $3.00), gives his reminiscences of some of the high spots of that career, humorous, dramatic, and factual. Beside the mail, Smith watched the idiosyncrasies of his chiefs and their intimates. You can learn about them and be amused at the same time.

Uncle, Aunt and Jezebel, by Martha Hedman (Scribner's, $3.00), gives the autobiographical recollections of the actress. It is light and entertaining. The uncle and aunt, who raised the author, furnish fun, constant argument, and reflections of daily life in old Finland. Jezebel is the name given to the "other woman" of Uncle Mathias by his wife.

Vincent Sheean traveled to India to interview Mahatma Gandhi in the winter of 1947. *Lead, Kindly Light,* Gandhi and the Way to Peace (Random House, $3.75), is both the record of that interview and a discussion of the inspirational nature of Gandhi's ideas and teachings. Sheean includes comments on the history of Indian affairs under British rule and earlier Indian leaders. In part it is also a discussion of theological values.

There is a Psychic World, by Horace Westwood, D. D. (Crown, $3.00), is an affirmation of the faith of Dr. Westwood in spirit manifestations and presence. The author comes of a long line of ministers, and relates his participation in experiments with mediums, and his conviction of the genuineness of the principles and practices involved. While interesting, it can offer no proof, at least to any reader who has previously attended private seances and emerged unconverted.

The position of Christian churches in Japan, both before and since the war, is delineated in *Japan Begins Again,* by William C. Kerr (Friendship Press, $1.50). Dr. Kerr enumerates the earlier spiritual history of the Japanese, Buddhism, and Shinto, and shows the advance of Christianity in this century and its possibilities for good influence on the Japanese in this period of transition.

FICTION

In *Silverlock* (Dutton, $3.00), John Myers Myers writes an allegorical novel of adventure in the land of the *Commonwealth.* Here his hero, known by these inhabitants as Silverlock, meets the legendary characters of myth and of history, and here at last he drinks at the Hippocrene Spring. If the reader sometimes feels smothered in mythology, he is rewarded with interesting verse, the cultural background, the implied moral, and above all, the good story.

Bruce Marshall, author of *The Flesh and Father Smith,* now writes of a simple French priest and his life through two world wars, in *To Every Man a Penny* (Houghton, Mifflin, $3.00). It is a story, not of adventure nor romance, but of faith: the faith of the Abbé Gaston, as it affected him and the lives of those around him. The French abbé really comes alive in this well-written novel.

HUMOR

Bill Mauldin has another success to his credit. *A Sort of a Saga* (Sloane, $3.50), is an autobiographical account of his youth with his parents and brother in New Mexico and Arizona. It is simple home stuff, with hilarious spots and some illustrations by the author to make a delightful volume.

Peter Arno's *Sizzling Platter* (Simon & Schuster, $2.95), is a collection of the usual Arno drawings, mostly from *The New Yorker,* with more or less amusing situations and cartoons.

Two women were preparing to board the air liner. One of them turned to the pilot and said, "Now, please don't travel faster than sound. We want to talk."
—*Tit-Bits* (London)

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



The THEATER ARTS



by John Gassner

Late in October the professional theatre rallied and began to produce work of special distinction that still makes it the aristocrat among the performing arts. But it continued to manifest the same complications that convince us season after season that the theatre is in the throes of some kind of deterioration and possible regeneration whose ultimate results are incalculable at present.

The simple line of theatrical showmanship continues, of course, without real alteration and without facing inner problems throughout the years. Even when the state of the drama was at its worst in mid-Victorian England and America, everything went swimmingly in the affairs of popular actor-managers or star personalities. The public still flocked to star performances and left the playhouse in a state of ecstasy. In this respect, the theatre is not only "eternal" but fundamentally unchanging—and it never really experiences a crisis.

During the present season on Broadway, it is the invulnerable Lunts who have been the first to represent this unassailable kind of showmanship, which may be called "pure theatre," since it depends neither on thought-content nor good writing. It has gratifications that have little to do with either literature or drama. Although performers like the Lunts can lend their talent to the substance of either, they can do just as well without the encumbrance of a script. Their forte is "pure theatre."

The Lunts have often proved this independence of the art of acting, but never so completely as in their latest vehicle, S. N. Behrman's adaptation of a French play by Marcel Achard, now entitled *I Know My Love*. This play is virtually non-existent while they are on the stage blithely making their own kind of theatre. It is as old as the Roman mimes and the Italian *commedia dell' arte,* for which no one even bothered to write a play—a synopsis was sufficient, and the rest was left to improvisation by the actors. When, indeed, the script of *I Know My Love* is visible, and this happens only when the Lunts are not on the stage, it proves itself to be a woefully empty and slipshod play. It has only one redeeming quality—the well articulated dialogue we have come to expect from Behrman. In fact, it is fairly obvious that whatever play there was to start with in Marcel Achard's work and in Behrman's adaptation has been cavalierly treated. It has been stretched, chopped up, pieced, and fitted to provide a holiday for the celebration of the Lunts' twenty-fifth anniversary as America's most celebrated acting couple.

In *I Know My Love,* the Lunts' appear first as an aged couple still very much in love, and following this display of virtuosity, they go through their entire repertory of flustered masculine impetuosity by Alfred Lunt and knowing femininity by Lynn Fontanne. We are never left in doubt as to Lynn's ability to cope with any situation in which Alfred is involved, and we see them traverse the path from youth to middle-age with the sure skill of tightrope walkers. It is an enchanting procession of make-believe, ageless as the art of virtuoso acting. It is utterly delightful theatre, provided you leave the drama out of mind and sight.

It is possible, indeed, to ask whether it is necessary to leave the drama out, and to regret that it has been left out. From time to

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

time, the Lunts have lent their talent to plays like *The Sea-Gull, Reunion in Vienna, Idiot's Delight,* and *There Shall Be No Night.* Are there no masterpieces of dramatic literature to which their talents are suited, and is there no moral obligation to bring them to life on a stage that is so empty of greatness these days? These thoughts will and must occur, even if the Lunts' are amoral with respect to the theatre and *above* literature—again of course only in the theatre. Nevertheless, their performance in *I Know My Love,* and the indubitable success of their venture under the Theatre Guild's auspices can serve to remind us that there is one kind of theatre that should give us no concern so long as the human protoplasm continues to produce actors of genius.

Unfortunately the number of such windfalls is never large. And if there were many Lunts in our time we should probably be less grateful for their blessings. Besides this consideration, we must add the stubborn fact that ours is a world of tensions and problems that clamor to be heard. The most faithful followers of the theatre, as contrasted with the clientele of the nightclubs exclusively, want to hear that world. And it is precisely the drama that is written to express contemporary life and thought that gets itself tangled up in the contradictions of an art that is as transitional as the society from which it stems.

At the opposite extreme of the Lunt vehicle, for example, New York has seen a play about the question of moral responsibility, *Montserrat.* It was originally the work of the French writer Emmanuel Roblés. It has been adapted by that most efficient of American playwrights, Lillian Hellman, who has such contemporary documents as *The Children's Hour, The Little Foxes,* and *Watch on the Rhine* to her credit. Two of our most successful producers joined hands in order to launch the play on Broadway, Kermit Bloomgarden and Gilbert Miller. Tribute to its importance has also been paid in the form of productions abroad, including one in Israel for which the former Group Theatre stage-director Harold Clurman, one of the most intelligent of American directors and critics, was imported from the United States.

The attention that has been given to *Montserrat* should surprise no one familiar with recent history. It is the story of a young Spanish officer who has become imbued with the ideals of democracy and humanitarianism of the early nineteenth century. Although he is a member of the Spanish army of occupation in Venezuela, he sympathizes with Bolivar and enables him to escape from the clutches of the Spanish commander. He becomes, in short, a traitor to his country in the interests of human freedom. His Calvary begins when his superior officer tries to compel him to betray Bolivar's whereabouts not by physical torture but by psychological and moral torture. Hostages are taken by the Spaniards, and they are to be shot one by one unless young Montserrat imparts the desired information. The play dramatizes his mental suffering and raises the difficult and vital question of whether he is justified in allowing innocent people to be executed in order to enable Bolivar to escape through the Spanish lines and continue to lead a revolutionary movement when its very outcome is in doubt. In the course of the proceedings, the play touches upon the lives of the hostages with considerable understanding and feeling.

On all counts, the play should have yielded a triumphant production. It is a mature and agonizing drama. The issue it presents has been experienced again and again in Europe, and it has concerned some of the best minds and most creative talents there, including Sartre and Arthur Koestler. In fact, an entire literature is possible and is in the process of being created on this subject.

Yet *Montserrat* has been unsuccessful on Broadway. Although it was treated with respect by the reviewers, it was found laborious and unexciting. Part of the blame lies with the production itself, as Montserrat was played by a young actor (William Redfield) whose powers are as yet inadequate to so exacting a role. Miss Hellman, who directed her own adaptation, took a pedestrian view of stage direction. The play itself falls short of the potentialities of the story because it is so largely taken up with a sequence of scenes in which each of the hostages goes through an agony of his own in trying to convince Montserrat to betray or not to betray Bolivar. The effect is too repetitive.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Although the production had its shortcomings, it cannot be singled out as the reason for the failure of the play on Broadway. The direction could not hurt the play sufficiently in this case, as the text requires no particular virtuosity from the stage director. Miss Hellman, moreover, managed to acquire some extremely talented actors for the cast—Emlyn Williams, whose acting is as good as his playwriting (*The Corn Is Green*); the brilliant veteran of the German stage Reinhold Schunzel; William Hansen; and John Abbott. It is the play in the first instance that has severely limited the possibility of enthusiasm for *Montserrat,* and this is more apparent here than abroad, where the public could bring to it its own experience.

The difficulty may be summarized as a case of new wine blowing up or at least spilling over when we try to pour it into old bottles. The old bottle in this case is the realistic form of dramaturgy. The charged and comprehensive story of *Montserrat* was concentrated into a single room and fitted together into a tightly knit account, the greater portion of which showed the young idealist writhing in torment while surrounded by the men, women, and children who are sacrificed to his silence. And the result was monotonous, although tense; prolix rather than dramatic.

The play should have been opened up, so to speak: the lives of the hostages should have been shown in characteristic situations of the past, perhaps by the flashback method. Their mental processes should have been exposed expressionistically. The mind and past experience of Montserrat, himself, should have been revealed to us by means of flashbacks and expressionism. The significance of Bolivar's revolution should have been theatrically created instead of stated prosaically. Tight dramaturgy strangled the play and reduced its significance as well as its excitement. Tight dramaturgy is, however, comparatively inexpensive. It requires only one set, a small cast, few stagehands, little lighting equipment. And tight dramaturgy is considered "good" dramaturgy, and has been so considered since Ibsen, if not indeed since Scribe supplanted romantic, Shakespearian drama with the economical "well-made play" technique.

For any number of reasons, we have been loath to use the theatre's full resources, its essential *theatricality,* and this at a time when the serious drama is most apt to need a rich and imaginative treatment. We constrict that which can be most meaningful and exciting only when it is expanded to encompass the full range of the dramatic material. Realism as a technique was ideal for bourgeois drama of the past century, when a personal problem could be examined within the bosom of a single family and then made representative of hundreds of thousands of other families. Drama since 1918 is most significant when it is not bourgeois drama at all, when it involves large numbers of people from divergent backgrounds in an issue not soluble and not perceptible in a domestic situation. But, for the most part, we are anachronistically trying to fit such dramatic material to the extremely limiting requirements of playwriting and staging on one level, at one time, in one place, and with one prosaic, reportorial and discursive style.

Between 1918 and 1925 it did seem for a time that a new kind of theatre and technique were aborning. It went under the general name of "expressionism." It virtually captured the Central European stage and resulted in this country in such plays as O'Neill's *The Hairy Ape* and *Emperor Jones* and, by extension, in plays like *The Great God Brown* and *Strange Interlude.* In the 1930's, too, the free and flexible technique asserted itself from time to time, in a *Waiting for Lefty, Native Son,* and *Bury the Dead.* But, owing to excesses in expressionism itself and to its expensiveness, we have slid back again. Today imaginative drama and staging tend to be confined to musical comedies and revues, in spite of the fact that the most successful current plays of a non-musical nature, *A Streetcar Named Desire* and *Death of a Salesman,* plainly reveal the advantage of some fluidity and imaginativeness.

I do not flatter myself into believing that these thoughts are unshared by others, and it is significant that the only two other new plays of any value at this writing have been *Lost in the Stars* and *Regina,* both departures from humdrum realism. The first is a dramatization of Alan Paton's notable novel about

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the problems of the Negro people in South Africa, *Cry the Beloved Country,* and the second is a version of Miss Hellman's *Regina.* Both are musical treatments, and qualify officially as musical entertainment. The first has a score by Kurt Weill, the second by Marc Blitzstein. Both men are redoubtable composers for the theatre. Mr. Blitzstein made his own adaptation, and the dramatization of *Cry the Beloved Country* is by none other than Maxwell Anderson. *Lost in the Stars,* we may add, is a "hit," and *Regina,* while less successful, is interesting, expert, and clever.

Both plays translate a realistic drama into imaginative terms. More than that, into *formalism.* Neither play, however, represents a triumphant realization of its material, precisely because of its musical stage formalism. In the case of *Regina,* the musical translation somehow diminishes the force of the original play (*The Little Foxes*). The snide characters don't quite fit into singing roles, and the effect is artificial. The effect of *Lost in the Stars* tends to be rhetorical. The original novel by Paton was compelling through its unforced simplicity and naturalness. In the Anderson-Weill dramatization, too much seems "arranged" for effect. The first half of the play seems a whirligig of spectacle and musical numbers, beautifully rendered by the good cast but somewhat at odds with the story and theme.

We must not be ungrateful for either production. *Lost in the Stars* becomes increasingly moving as it proceeds, and not merely because its theme of racial prejudice rouses emotion. The sufferings of a Zulu priest in search of his son who falls into evil ways in Johannesburg are touching. Todd Duncan is frequently affecting as the priest, if a trifle less genuine in his portraiture than we might expect. Leslie Banks is superb as the white man whose son is killed by the priest's son. Rouben Mamoulian has directed the play with great skill and verve. Many of the musical numbers by themselves are more than gratifying, especially "The Wild Justice," "Stay Well," "Thousands of Miles," and "Cry, the Beloved Country."

It is difficult not to surrender to the Anderson-Weill dramatization a good deal of the time. But even if it were perfect in every respect, the treatment belongs to a formal and special branch of the theatre arts which has its own place and right to appreciation but does not take the place of the play inherent in the novel. Such a play would not be a small-scale opera but a work in which expressionistic art would extend the reality of the novel rather than sublimate the contents. *Lost in the Stars* is not always on good terms with its matter and seems less than genuine much of the time. This is not because of any particular shortcomings in the talent of Mr. Anderson or Mr. Weill but because the art-form selected by them is only half-right for the Paton novel. They were right in selecting expressionistic and telescopic treatment for the work. They were right even in wanting to use music, but wrong in making their play operatic. They were evidently looking for a style of treatment that did not entirely crystallize for them, and it has not quite crystallized yet anywhere except in the mind of the German playwright-poet Bertolt Brecht.

The alternative to their style might have been a folk-treatment like the original *Porgy* of the Theatre Guild, the *folk-play* augmented by the singing of spirituals on suitable dramatic occasions before George Gershwin transformed it into the folk-opera *Porgy and Bess.* But the simple folk-play is somewhat unsuitable for the social drama implicit and explicit in the novel *Cry, the Beloved Country.* The fact of the matter may be that a completely satisfactory form for a play like *Lost in the Stars* does not yet exist. It would have had to be invented by Anderson and Weill, and this is no easy matter.

In truth, the present age is no help at all to playwrights. The only safe and easy dramatic convention it offers them is an outmoded realism, which hampers them more often than it helps them. They may try to help themselves by borrowing a technique. With few exceptions the only practical one they dare rely on, at least for commercial production, is the musical comedy pattern, which is apt to lessen the genuineness of their work when the reality of the subject is of paramount importance. *Lost in the Stars* is a transitional work of art, and it would have been a miracle if it had not shown all the earmarks of being precisely that.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CAN UNIFICATION WORK?

Who is right?
The Air Force?
The Navy?

By CAROL L. THOMPSON

The problem: The Navy-Air Force squabble was aired and left to cool by the first session of the Eightieth Congress. The basic "bones of contention" have been bared. Beyond all questions of strategy lies the fundamental issue for the voters: when "experts" disagree, what must the people do?

UNIFICATION of the Armed Services in the Department of Defense has obviously not been the cure-all for the difficulties between the Army and the Navy of the United States.

As the Hoover Commission pointed out last year, no organization "is any better than the men who run it; a near organization chart is not a panacea for all ills."

In part, of course, the differences of opinion between the Army and the Navy grew out of organizational frictions, in part out of traditional rivalries. But a large part of the problem of coordinating the services has risen from honest and fundamental differences of opinion among the high officers of both the services as to the proper role of each service in the national defense establishment. Only the ignorant or the misinformed could have believed that the creation of a tri-fold Department of Defense would in itself solve the problem so clearly and tragically raised at Pearl Harbor.

The Eberstadt Committee (of the Hoover Commission) had pointed out long since that:

> In the final analysis, both efficiency and economy are dependent upon the wisdom and ability of the men entrusted with its control and upon a spirit of mutual loyalty, teamwork and unity of purpose throughout the organization. . . . Optimum efficiency can be achieved only as the product of education and experience over a long period of time.

A clear distinction should be made here between the basic frictions existing in the Defense Department and the particular disagreement which brings the difficulty to a head this year. Basically, neither the Army, the Air Force, nor the Navy will willingly accept a subordinate role in the defensive and offensive strategy of the national military program. The problem is in large part financial, since there is now, as always, a definite financial limit within which appropriations for the three establishments must be apportioned. Although all three services concede the importance of all three, none is willing to submit to a reduction in its own appropriations in order to boost the expenditures of another.

Translated into specific terms, in 1949, the Navy took the spotlight because it was overruled on appropriations and because it was expected to stand by while additional funds built up a new air force program centering on the B-36 long-range bomber. Specifically, the controversy rages around the fact that with the approval of Defense Secretary Louis Johnson, Cabinet head of all armed services, the Air Force is receiving more than $1,000,000,000 for the inter-continental B-36 bomber, while Navy aviation is being cut down. Navy plans for building a new "super-carrier," for example, were cancelled by the Defense Secretary in September.

The Air Force-Navy controversy, important as it may be for the military defense of the United States, raises equally vital problems for democratic government in general. In a democratic country such as ours, how much military information should be released to the general public, the voting electorate? How much control should the Congress of the United States exercise over the appro-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

priation of funds for the various military establishments of the country? Who is to have the deciding voice when military experts flatly, sincerely and uncompromisingly disagree as to the best methods of offensive and defensive warfare?

Whether or not the United States, in 1950, concentrates on super-carriers or on B-36 airplanes, these questions remain to plague the thinking democrat. Since the beginning of the controversy discussed below, there have been charges from well-informed sources (including General Bradley himself) that the naval discussion in the Senate committee was "disloyal" to the United States, released important secret information for the benefit of our enemies, and brought to light differences which should have remained secret. This premise needs serious consideration.

It is of course obvious that in the middle of a devastating war, the American public could not and should not have been consulted on whether to release the atomic bomb at Hiroshima, and, compounding evil, at Nagasaki. Once committed to the holocaust, there is no question that the democratic control of the American public is subordinate to the problem of mere survival nor that this problem must remain in the hands of the military. In time of peace, however, there is some question as to how far "military necessity" should cover war strategy and war aims with secrecy.

THE NAVY

The problem now brought up by the Navy of the "morality" of indiscriminate "area bombing" and the coldblooded use of the atom bomb in devastating enemy countries is surely one that calls for prolonged public discussion. Whether in case of war we intend to conquer by utter destruction of civilian and soldier alike—whether, indeed, we have any choice in the matter—is far too important a moral, diplomatic, and political problem to be left entirely to the military. It may certainly be argued that Congress is better suited to making final decisions on important military and naval appropriations than is a single official in the Defense Department, no matter what his experience and impartiality.

As it stands, this reads like a brief for the Navy side of the controversy, until it is realized that were the Air Force the attacker, and the Navy the defender, there would be no more ardent defense of "secrecy" and military necessity than that self-same Navy which now questions the morality of bombing. The problem of Naval-Air Force rivalry thus brings up one of the most difficult problems of our times.

From the Navy viewpoint, the B-36, "an airplane of 1941," is a "billion dollar blunder" that will dangerously weaken the United States Navy. The basic problem, according to Navy spokesmen, is the preservation of a strong Navy, which is vitally necessary to the adequate defense of the United States. There is, of course, a school of thought today which holds that naval power is obsolete and that the next war will be fought in the air, by long-range intercontinental bombers armed with atomic bombs and other atomic weapons. Despite the importance of air power—and naval authorities anxious to go ahead with a super-carrier program surely concede its importance—control of the sea is still one of the vital factors in modern warfare, and is likely to remain so.

What do we mean when we speak of sea power? Surely not battleships, surely not merely warships of all classes! A definition given by Bernard Brodie (*Layman's Guide to Naval Strategy*), fits this discussion:

> It [sea power] has always meant the sum total of those weapons, installations, and geographical circumstances which enable a nation *to control transportation over the seas during wartime*. . . . All naval enterprise, with the exception of bombardments of land objectives from the sea, which is only an incidental use of sea power—is directed toward the single aim of affecting the movements of the lowly freighter or transport in which it carried nearly all the commodities and the men that move across the sea. If in the future the greater part of ocean transport is carried in aircraft rather than in ships, or if the transfer of men and commodities across the seas becomes unimportant, sea power as such will cease to have meaning. At the present time [1942], however, because of the most telling economic and engineering considerations, neither of these contingencies seems near at hand. . . .

In 1949, the decline of sea power, as Mr. Brodie defines it, is still far in the future. In World War II, obviously, command of the Atlantic and Pacific sea lanes was vital to our

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

victory. The success of the air forces in Europe would have been impossible without the food, fuel, and other supplies and the crews transported near enemy lines in ships. So long as we are able to fight from the frontiers of friendly nations across the sea, we shall need control of the sea. To plan waging war from the shores of the United States instead would be to court disaster.

In World War II, for example, it was the ceaseless stream of supplies flowing across the Atlantic that did much to stem the German tide. The tramp steamer and the warship both became important parts of naval strategy, but it must be remembered that without the protection of the warship the steamer could not have played her role. As Brodie has pointed out: ". . . . to all the embattled nations in the Second Warld War there was nothing quite so valuable as a ship."

The long and violent air war which Japan waged against China, the terrific bombardments endured by the British, did not force the victim nations from the war. Air power was extremely important in World War II but it cannot be claimed that it was decisive. And without the sea power to keep it supplied, air power would have made a paltry showing.

SEA POWER

The first argument for the Navy, then, is the necessity for maintaining control of the seas, not only to fight defensively to protect our shores against enemy ships, but to maintain control of the seas. This argument answers in large measure the claim of naval critics that since our only strong potential enemy is Russia, and since Russia has no strong navy, the United States needs a navy no longer.

The second argument for the Navy is a continuation of this, i.e., that the United States Navy today faces a heavier burden than ever before in maintaining Western sea mastery. The simple fact of the deterioration of British naval power means that our navy faces tremendous new responsibilities throughout the western world and in the far reaches of the Pacific. The days when we were able to maintain a one ocean navy and rely on the British for protection in the Atlantic are gone, perhaps forever. Today, an impoverished Great Britain is hard pressed to take care of her own shrinking colonial obligations. She has no extra strength to spare for us.

It must be recognized, before we proceed with the naval arguments, that high official strategists in the Army and the Air Force are fully cognizant of the importance of sea power in offensive and defensive warfare. Not an intelligent officer among them would dispute the necessity for our maintaining a strong navy today for the protection of the United States. The question at issue becomes one of definition: what constitutes a strong navy in modern terms, and what are its functions as distinct from the functions of the Army and Air Force.

During war-time, the control of the sea implies several differing functions. Land and air forces must be protected as they travel overseas. As Hitler learned to his sorrow in World War II, it was impossible to throw an amphibious expedition across the English Channel without control of the 20-mile stretch of water. Neither the Channel, nor the Atlantic Ocean, can be crossed by the best army in the world unless the sea lanes are protected for that army.

Secondly, during war-time, the Navy must be able to protect the ships which carry the raw materials necessary for modern warfare. The operation of the Berlin Airlift, splendid as it was, highlights the necessity for naval transport during war-time. The daily ton-mileage involved in Vittles at the peak was 2,000,000 per day. Supplying the strategic needs of the United States requires 500,000,000 ton-miles daily. One victory ship could easily handle the daily ton-mileage involved in the Berlin Airlift maneuver—and this maneuver supplied one city at a distance of only 200 miles.

In addition, the transportation of supplies by air instead of by ship involves a tremendous supply of gasoline, and the gasoline for a long overseas haul cannot be transported by air. For air transport on a large scale, therefore, a merchant fleet of tankers twice as big as the original fleet of cargo ships would be required. And these ships would, of course, need naval protection. Should gaso-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

line be available at both ends of the air run, the world supply of gasoline would soon be exhausted by the maneuver.

Americans must never lose sight of the fact that the United States today is by no means self sufficient from a military point of view. Such vital materials as uranium, tin, manganese, oil, and rubber must be imported—and not all these can be stock-piled in sufficient quantity for our defense in war-time.

A third function of the Navy in war-time is to prevent the enemy from using the sea to transport his own armies. As was noted above, it was because the Allied powers had control of the seas during World War II that Hitler was unable to move his powerful armies from the European mainland to the British Isles. For the same reason, the Japanese armies were continually thwarted in their efforts to move their armies en masse into the Southern islands. The prevention of enemy invasion is, of course, a prime function of the Navy at all times. As a corollary, control of the sea prevents an enemy or potential enemy from acquiring bases in the Western Hemisphere for short-range bombers. Thus war against the United States mainland would have to be waged by cumbersome, slow intercontinental bombers easier to intercept by our Air Force jet fighters.

Boycotting the enemy is another important naval function. There are other important offensive functions of an adequate navy, including the providing of a mobile aircraft base for assaulting land objectives, intercepting enemy planes over the ocean, and strafing them on their home bases. In the Philippines, in Formosa, and even on the Japanese mainland, Admiral Halsey's planes attacked enemy aircraft, destroying 5,800 Jap planes on the ground during World War II.

Granting the desirability of a strong Navy, and granting the importance of all the functions ascribed to the Navy in the paragraphs above, the question of what constitutes adequate naval strength remains. In a recent article for the *Saturday Evening Post* (October 29, 1949), Admiral D. V. Gallery, U.S.N., pointed out that "unless your navy is strong in the air, there isn't much use in having any navy." As he remarked, "in 1949, a navy stripped of its air arm would be about as useful as a fleet of sailing ships in World War I." A corollary to the need for naval aircraft is the need for powerful carrier task forces, equipped with modern aircraft carriers.

Why does the Navy believe that it needs a powerful air arm of its own, when the Air Force of the United States stands ready to help it? The answer lies partly in the nature of the traditional functions of the Navy, outlined above, and the functions specifically assigned to the Navy under the Unification Act and the subsequent agreements at Key West and Newport. To the Navy today goes the major burden of anti-submarine warfare and amphibious operations, in order to perform the major naval task of keeping sea passages open. For defensive action with our convoys in war-time, the Navy obviously needs long-range patrol planes based ashore, patrol planes based on mobile carriers and destroyers. To prevent subs from ever getting within attacking range, the Navy needs also fast task forces to search out and destroy enemy submarines in their home waters hundreds of miles from the convoys. In addition, the Navy must provide what has been termed "local" control of the air around merchant ships to prevent their bombing by enemy planes.

CARRIERS

Without detracting one iota from the splendid record of the army bombers and fighters and their very important role in war-time, the Navy is proud of the record and the performance of its own carrier-based planes, which play an entirely different part in total warfare. Various technical improvements, including the development of modern jet aircraft, give carrier-based planes some advantages over land planes today—advantages that were non-existent during World War II. As Admiral Gallery points out: "Operating from a carrier will be an advantage rather than a disadvantage to the jet planes of the future . . . . unless we hamstring the aircraft designers by saying, 'Design your 1955 airplanes to operate from 1945 carriers!'"

Carrier-based planes have one enormous advantage over transoceanic land planes: they can arrive with rested crews, and full gasoline tanks, ready to go into action, practically on the doorstep of the enemy. Whereas land-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

based air force planes must perforce be handicapped in action by the necessity for building them to fly very long distances, carrier planes are not so retarded. This means very simply that the naval carrier is still vital and that the carrier-based plane will be able to play an increasingly important part in modern warfare. In the war against Japan, carrier task forces destroyed more than 14,000 Japanese aircraft, half the grand total destroyed by Allied action.

Nor are carriers as vulnerable as the public has been led to believe. Although the Navy lost four big carriers to enemy aircraft and submarines in the first year of the war, in the last three years of the struggle (after the Navy learned how to fight fires), not a single big carrier was lost. And this although they spent 63 per cent of their time in combat zones!

The crux of the current Navy-Air Force controversy stems from the Navy's insistence on what it terms adequate appropriations for building up naval air power. The controversy was touched off by Captain John G. Crommelin's public charge that the Navy's offensive power was being "nibbled to death" in the Pentagon defense headquarters. Basic to the problem is Secretary Johnson's plan to economize in the Department of Defense to the extent of $800,000,000 below Congressional appropriations before the end of June, 1950. In the House hearings on the friction among the services, Mr. Johnson testified that tentative plans call for Navy savings of $350,000,000—nine per cent of its total expected appropriation; Army cuts of about $300,000,000—eight per cent; and Air Force reductions of $150,000,000—a decrease of about three and one half per cent. These figures, according to Johnson, originated with the management committee of the Department of Defense, headed by General Joseph T. McNarney of the Air Force.

Prior to notification about Johnson's plan for economy, the Navy had made plans for a giant aircraft carrier able to launch planes which could drop atomic bombs. It is claimed by high naval authorities that the economies will in effect cripple the naval air force in order to build up the Air Force's B-36 bomber program.

Secretary of Defense Johnson was severely criticized by naval partisans first of all for attempting administrative economy. He was accused at the House Armed Services Committee hearings by Representative Carl Vinson of Georgia (Democrat) of "making a grandstand play" in his moves for economy.

Admiral Richard L. Conolly, commander of United States naval forces in the Eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean, testified as to the crippling effects of Johnson's proposed reduction. He believed, he declared, that the remaining funds alloted for the whole Navy would be less than his own "minimum requirements" in European waters. He pointed to the obligations undertaken by the United States under the Atlantic Pact to give "direct" immediate support to Western Europe in case of war.

THE B-36

More bitter, and equally important, is the Navy's all-out attack on high Air Force policy, as personified in current plans for putting $1,000,000,000 into an intercontinental Air Force bomber. Admiral Radford and many other naval officers of high standing have denounced the B-36 as the "symbol" of the Air Force theory of warfare, leading the public on to believe in a "cheap and easy victory if war should come." It is claimed for the Navy by Radford and others that the B-36 is vastly overrated, that it cannot engage in precision bombing at altitudes above 40,000 feet and that below this level it cannot survive without the fighter protection we cannot supply at such long-range.

Like Admiral Radford, Admiral Halsey attacked the whole theory of strategic bombing. He asserted that the policy could have no "immediate and direct effect of delaying invading armies." And, he continued,

> The mass bombing of cities can only produce delayed, remote, and indirect effects on the course of the war.
>
> I believe there is a place in our arsenal of weapons for the very best bombers we can get. I favor the use of these bombers against the strategic targets of oil and transportation. But I do not favor the concept that the principal weapon in our national arsenal should be a weapon designed to conduct seige operations.

Captain Trapnell of the Navy appeared before the Committee to list what he termed six

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"false premises" about the B-36, including the belief that radar will be ineffective against it, that fighter pilots would have trouble finding it, that it can defend itself, and that no night fighter exists which could intercept it in the dark. According to Trapnell, current fighters have "the same superiority over the B-36 that the fighters had over the bombers of World War II. . . . The Corsair night fighter now in service has a performance adequate to intercept the B-36 at 40,000 feet. It has a radar which is effective with ground control. . . . " Trapnell, like other naval authorities, repeatedly scored the Air Force for its refusal to engage with the Navy in joint tests on the B-36.

The Navy also attacked the moral implications of strategic bombing plans which, Rear Admiral Ralph A. Ofstie declared, were "contrary to our fundamental ideals." "It is time," declared Ofstie, "that strategic bombing be squarely faced in this light; that it be examined in relation to the decent opinion of mankind."

Not only would adoption of strategic bombing on a large scale by the United States be "ruthless and barbaric" implying the "random slaughter of men, women and children in the enemy country," but it would clearly mean the slaughter of many of our allies and the complete destruction of their territories in a third world war. Such a policy, according to naval authorities, is clearly opposed to our commitments in the Atlantic Pact.

United States reliance on atomic bombing alone in the event of another war is, of course, open to this same criticism. In addition, say naval spokesmen, atomic attacks are not as powerful as the public believes. They are far more destructive in crowded civilian areas and are not completely adaptable to use in bombing military targets. They will by no means be as effective against the Russians, for example, as they will against more highly concentrated American urban areas. If used in Europe, they will annihilate thousands and thousands of our Allies without stopping the march of the Soviet armies, if these armies are overrunning the continent.

According to naval experts, and many army specialists agree, the next war, like the last, will depend in large part on the ordinary foot soldier—and he, in the last analysis, will depend on the United States Navy for his ammunition and supplies. This does not mean that the United States should abandon atom bomb research. Naturally, in the event of war, this country will utilize every available weapon, including the bomb wherever this seems desirable. But it may well be, say naval authorities, that with the United States and the U.S.S.R. both holding bombs, neither side will dare to initiate their use.

In any event, according to the naval officers who testified at the recent hearings, a strong Navy means a safe country, and a defenceless Navy means a defenceless nation behind it. If the United States hopes on the one hand to prevent a third world war and on the other hand to keep it far from our shores if it comes, it behooves the citizens of this country to maintain an adequate Navy. A strong, adequate Navy absolutely requires a naval air arm, with new, modern aircraft carriers for mobile bases. If this requirement can be met only at the sacrifice of some part of our offensive air force arm, then the sacrifice must be made.

THE AIR FORCE

Describing the admirals at the House hearings as men in "open rebellion" against civil authority doing "infinite harm" to the United States, General Omar N. Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, outlined in some detail the Air Force viewpoint on the recent Navy-Air Force debate.

"The real issue to which we should devote our attention," he declared to the House Armed Services Committee, "is whether or not we are providing for the security of this country with the least expense to our economy."

Today, the Army of the United States has an approximate strength of 650,000. Appropriations for 1949 had provided for an Army of 790,000 men, plus 110,000 one-year trainees, or a total of 900,000 men. The Air Force believes that it should have 70 groups in order to carry out its mission, a belief based on studies made by the President's Air Policy Commission and a Congressional Aviation Policy Board. But after much congressional discussion, the Air Force has today an allot-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ment of 58 groups (reduced by Presidential order to 48). The Navy, true enough, has also taken a share of the reduction in military expenditures, with its large carrier force to be reduced in number from 11 to 8.

In other words, all branches of the United States armed forces have had to accept reductions in strength because of economy measures. Facing this necessity, General Bradley declared, "In order to provide maximum security with minimum risk and minimum expense, I have advocated balanced forces. . . ."

What is meant, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by "balance"?

> When I speak of balance, declared Bradley, I don't mean the dividing of funds equally among three services, nor do I mean an equation of so many ships equal so many soldiers equal so many air groups, to create a pattern on a chart.
>
> When I speak of balance, I mean effective forces equal to the tasks that modern warfare may thrust upon us. And in striking that balance we must include that which can be reliably contributed by our allies.
>
> It so happens that approximately one-third of our money has been allotted to each service. but I consider this as only a coincidence, and may not necessarily hold as we continue to evaluate the capabilities of the only aggressor in sight, and future developments in warfare.
>
> I am convinced that further economy will be forthcoming for the over-all defense expenditures and I have no faith that the cuts will be exactly proportional. My own opinion will be based not on dollars but on the security problem that faces each of the armed services in carrying out its mission.

One of the basic tenets of the Air Force defense against recent naval criticism is the charge, clearly outlined by Secretary of the Air Force Symington, that naval testimony is imperilling the security of the United States. In opening the Air Force rebuttal before the House Armed Services Committee on October 18, 1949, Mr. Symington declared:

> To me the most disturbing feature of these attacks against the Air Force and the rest of the Military Establishment is what they have done and are doing to imperil the security of the United States.
>
> It was bad enough to have given a possible aggressor technical and operating details of our newest and latest equipment.
>
> In my opinion it was far worse to have opened up to him in such detail the military doctrines of how this country would be defended.
>
> We have now given the military leaders of any aggressor nation a further advantage in developing their strategic plan by telling them so much about our own. . . .

Later on in his testimony, Mr. Symington raised still another issue, but refused to elaborate on his statement. "It is now obvious," he declared, "that the fundamental question at issue is control of the military by civilians, and therefore the preservation of constitutional government."

A second charge against Navy conduct of the hearings grew out of the amazing number of "unofficial" comments from "anonymous naval officers," releases of secret letters, and other undercover and underhanded snipes at Air Force and Army policy.

Thirdly, according to Air Force testimony, the Air Force willingly accepts decisions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff when such decisions go against them; the Navy refuses to bow to higher authority. The Navy, in other words, has never accepted the unification act and in effect is determined to break it through public hearings if in no other manner.

DEFENSE

Of the immediate question at issue, appropriations for the B-36 long-range bomber, Mr. Symington, General Bradley, and others united in defense of the policy under attack. According to Symington, the B-36 will by no means be the only weapon in the arsenal. According to present plans, "a maximum" of eight per cent of all Air Force groups will use the B-36 bomber. Secretary Symington charged that the Navy's real objection to the B-36 was its extraordinarily long-range, which will detract somewhat from naval glory.

Of the naval charge that the B-36 cannot perform as Air Force authorities claim, General Bradley pointed out in his testimony that: " . . . . no Navy pilot has flown a B-36, nor have they participated in any tests with this bomber. On the other hand, our Air Force bombardiers have assured us that this aircraft can perform effectively under all conditions of weather, by night or day, and can deliver striking blows against their targets."

The B-36, furthermore, was approved for

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

construction in quantity by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in February, 1949, by unanimous consent. The implication is strong that subsequent naval criticism had more to do with economy cuts in its own budget than in any real criticism of the B-36.

The Air Force, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have not relished the accusations that their over-all strategy calls for "ruthless and immoral" bombing of civilians. First of all, say the defenders of the Air Force position, war is immoral from the word "go," and mass bombing cannot be defended on ethical grounds. But strategic bombing can be justified during war-time if it shortens the war and saves lives for the United States and its allies. This, the final justification for Hiroshima and Nagasaki, still remains the only defensible position on bombing at any time. Further, points out the Air Force, the Navy until recently was clamoring for carriers to support naval planes carrying atomic weapons; naval interest in morality is strangely opportune.

No responsible Army or Air Force officer at the House hearings raised any question about the necessity for an adequate Navy. General Bradley himself declared that "I personally believe in naval aviation, and especially in the hunter-killer task forces that are needed to fight Soviet submarines; and I endorse wholeheartedly an adequate program of naval aviation to assure us of control over enemy navies, and the ability to subdue the sterner submarine menace. . . ."

Here, again, the Navy and the Air Force may be said to face an honest difference of opinion. According to General Bradley,

> . . . . The arguments for increased large carriers have not been based for need on action against a Russian fleet, nor even on naval aviation against the menace of the submarine. Their presentations have demanded increased carrier strength to attack land targets and to oppose hostile air in limited areas for a limited time. This is not the Navy's primary mission.
>
> Such power would be nice to have, but does it contribute as much to the requirements to meet the initial stages of a war as the same amount spent for other more vital needs? It cannot be furnished without reducing the strength of either the Army, the Air Force, or the Navy's ability to perform its primary mission of keeping the sea lanes open.

General Bradley also explained to the committee why the Navy is sometimes outvoted in meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a situation which has led to much ill-feeling. According to Bradley,

> The truth of the matter is that very few Navy men on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations, have had any experience in large scale land operations. . . . This may account for the fact that in joint planning, where knowledge of the larger continental operations which we must ultimately face if we ever go to war with a land power is a "must", Navy men frequently find their suggestions outvoted two to one. . . .

Perhaps the most careful and comprehensive defense of Air Force policies was offered by General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Air Force Chief of Staff, in his testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on October 19, 1949. Excerpts from his statement are printed herewith:

> The public is entitled to receive assurances as to the care and thoroughness with which strategic decisions are worked out, as to the soundness of the decisions made, and as to the adequacy of the weapons with which the country's armed forces are provided.
>
> In matters of strategy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff hold the position of primary authority. . . . Every shade and variation of military viewpoint has its opportunity for expression in the Joint Staff. All views cannot prevail. Decisions must be made. . . .
>
> In my previous testimony before this committee, I invited your attention to the agreement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff upon the strategic concept. At that time I quoted you the following sentence, which I here repeat:
>
> "The Joint Chiefs of Staff separately and jointly are of the firm opinion that the concept of strategic bombing, and the extent of its employment as now planned, are sound."
>
> The Strategic Air Command, the only agency charged with strategic bombing by the Air Force, is a major command of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It receives its directives from the Joint Chiefs, not from the Air Force. Its targets and target systems are selected by the Joint Chiefs as part of national war plans.
>
> Our national strategic plans are not worked out on a lone-wolf basis. The free peoples of Western Europe are working with us in increasingly close cooperation. We have made common cause with these friendly countries in preventing the outbreak of a war or defeating an aggressor if a war should start. . . .

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Witnesses have here recommended that we cancel out the country's capability of conducting a strategic offensive with atomic weapons. Adoption of this proposal would, in my judgment, destroy the one greatest equalizing factor in the balance of military power between a potential enemy and the Western democracies and could only be received with contempt or despair by those who have joined together for common defense. . . .

Much has been said here about an enemy capability of stopping bomber attacks. They can locate the bombers with a radar screen, it is said. They can put thousands of jet fighters into the air and shoot them down, it is said. Their guided missiles defending their cities can hit them if the fighters do not, it is said.

The people who have said these things seem not to realize that B-36's, B-47's and B-50's by merely existing can and do force the Soviet Union to channel its industrial power, technological skill, manpower, and money into purely defensive measures and thus cut down resources which could otherwise be devoted to offensive purposes.

And what is the alternative presented by the (proposed) curtailment of long-range strategic bombing and the concentration of our effort on tactical aviation?

It is this: Tactical aviation supports ground troops and ground divisions. Is it proposed that we build and maintain a standing army capable of meeting the masses of an enemy army on the ground in equal man-to-man, body-to-body, gun-to-gun combat?

This alternative offers us the prospect of a wholly defensive war. We wait until we are attacked. Then we undertake to hold the masses of enemy troops on the ground. Finally, if we seek victory, we undertake to provide the ground-force power to press the enemy back into his homeland until he gives up—and in this we might be following the fairly unattractive example of Napoleon and Hitler.

Mr. Chairman, this alternative is militarily unsound. A prime objective of this country must be to find a counterbalance to the potential enemy's masses of ground troops other than equal masses of American and Allied ground troops. No such balancing factor exists other than strategic bombing, including the atomic bomb. . . .

Lest this statement be again tortured into a declaration that strategic bombardment can win a war alone, let me restate my belief that, if a future war comes, ultimately it must be concluded on the ground, like most of the wars of the past. But it is the objective of the strategic bombardment program—an objective which has been proved in battle—so to weaken the sustaining sources of enemy troops that they can be defeated in less time at less cost. . . .

This committee and the country have heard assertions during the last two weeks that the B-36 can not do its job. . . . The assertions have been made categorically and dogmatically. None of the witnesses was beset by doubts—none appeared troubled by the fact that substantially all of the professionals in this type of operation held an exactly contrary view. . . .

The unsupported assertions that the task of the B-36 is impossible will not force me into the position of stating that it is easy. It is in fact difficult in the same sense that all military tasks in the face of the enemy are difficult.

I have considered the questions as to the capabilities of our strategic bombers and I have arrived at the clear conclusion that they can do their job. As the professional military head of the United States Air Force I so assure the country and so declare to the world, especially to our friends. . . .

I further assure you that the confidence of myself and of my senior officers in this matter is not complacency. . . . We are constantly laboring to improve the equipment and the tactics with which this job may have to be done. There is no sentimental attachment to any aircraft and, as has been abundantly proved, no personal or political attachment to any aircraft manufacturer.

Newer faster aircraft will be brought forward just as quickly as our most strenuous efforts and the appropriations with which we are supplied will permit. . . .

The subject of carrier aviation is a complex one. It is not simply a question: Are you for them or against them? There are carriers of different types and for different purposes. There are carriers which are necessary against some enemies and not necessary against others. . . .

I am in favor of the greatest possible development of carrier aviation to whatever extent carriers and their aircraft are necessary for fulfillment of a strategic plan against the one possible enemy we may have to face. Less than this would be unsound; more than this is an unjustifiable burden upon the American taxpayer. . . .

In the Second World War we fought two different enemies in two hemispheres.

In Europe our enemy was essentially a land power with a large submarine fleet and a few surface units designed for commerce raiding.

In that theatre of war the Allied powers un-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dertook two great amphibious operations—the landings in North Africa and the landing in Normandy. As any student of history will recall, carrier aviation performed a significant, but not a predominant, function in the war against Germany. Carriers participated in anti-submarine warfare and in the protection of our supply lines in Europe. In the initial support of the North African landing certain tactical aircraft operated briefly from carriers. No carrier task groups were used.

In the war against Japan the situation was entirely different. We faced an island empire. The Japanese home islands were dependent upon ocean commerce for raw materials and even food. This empire had a major surface fleet, including many aircraft carriers. Our intermediate objectives were island outposts, and our ultimate objective was the Japanese home islands themselves.

In this war grew up that powerful sea weapon, the carrier task force. The fleets that operated under Admiral Halsey, Admiral Mitscher, and Admiral Spruance drove enemy fleets from the seas and were important factors in the island-hopping campaign. . . .

Any war we may have to fight in the future will obviously be unlike the Pacific Ocean war against Japan. It will tend to resemble the war against Germany, though with certain differences.

There will be the same problem of killing submarines, and the enemy submarines seem likely to be greater in number and more capable in performance than anything we faced in World War II.

There will be the same problem of protecting Atlantic Ocean supply lines, although the threat to our shipping will come almost wholly from the submarine since the potential enemy has no surface units of the character of the Bismarck and the Tirpitz. There may or may not be amphibious landings; but if there are, they will be like the landings in North Africa and Normandy and not like the landings in the Pacific islands.

Finally, the industrial heart of the potential enemy lies, not on any sea shore, not on any island, but deep inside the Eurasian land mass.

It is to that type of war that we must adapt all of our forces, including carrier aviation. . . .

What does this mean in terms of specific decision about carriers as a part of our total national defense equipment? . . .

First, I am not only willing but insistent that the types of carriers which can help meet the threat of an enemy submarine fleet shall be developed fully and kept in instant readiness. The sea lanes must be kept open. . . .

Second, I do not believe there is justification for maintaining large carrier task forces during peace-time unless they are required by the strategic plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In my judgment they are not required by those plans.

Third, I do not believe that it is sound to construct the ship of which the hull was designated CVA-58, which was given the name U.S.S. United States, and is popularly known as the supercarrier. . . . My opposition to building it comes from the fact that I can see no necessity for a ship with those capabilities in any strategic plan against the one possible enemy.

The Congressional inquiry into the extraordinary argument among the highest military authorities in the United States was concluded on October 21, 1949. The House Armed Services Committee will not write its recommendations until after the second session of the Eighty-first Congress convenes in January. Although the hearings focused attention on bitter personality differences and on important questions of strategy (see above), the basic problem remained a budgetary one. This difficulty is expected to increase when the total defense budget, around $14,000,000,000 this year, is cut to $13,000,000,000 in 1950.

Thus the "Battle of the Pentagon" is not over yet. Whether it enlightened the American public by calling attention to important strategic decisions is questionable. Fortunately, whether it gave aid and comfort to our potential enemies is at least equally doubtful. The Navy did not seem inclined to deviate from its hostile position; the Air Force shows no inclination to devaluate its opinion.

More directly affected by the hearings are personal relations between high-ranking Army, Air Force, and naval officers. Admiral Louis E. Denfeld was removed from his post as Chief of Naval Operations on October 27. Vice Admiral Forrest Percival Sherman was subsequently appointed to succeed him as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It should be noted here that Admiral Sherman was not among the naval officers testifying at the recent hearing. Although as an airman he may be expected to show sympathy for the naval position, he is known as a diplomat with tact. As the Battle of the Pentagon continues, diplomacy and tact will be sorely needed.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CONGRESS DEBATES:

Farm Price Supports

POLITICIANS of both parties were indelibly impressed with the necessity of courting the farmer after the notorious elections of November, 1948. Farm price support legislation was thus on the must list for the first session of the Eightieth Congress.

This was a question on which it was impossible to reach any unanimous agreement. There were at least half a dozen different plans offered to Congress in the course of this session. Almost everyone agreed, however, that the Aiken farm bill, passed by the Eightieth Congress in 1948, could not be allowed to go into effect in 1951. The opposition to the plan proposed by Secretary of Agriculture Brannan was almost universal. This plan called for selling perishable farm products in the competitive open market. The difference between the market price and the Brannan 100 per cent parity was to have been paid by the government.

In the middle of the summer, the House passed a farm bill which provided for a rigid, high support schedule. But the Senate had a difficult time deciding what to do about the farmer. Not until October 12 did it finally pass a bill which provided for the long-range support of basic commodities—wheat, cotton, corn, peanuts, rice, milk, and butter fat—on a sliding scale at 75 to 90 per cent of parity. Before this the Senate had approved proposals which would have continued rigid, high supports.

A conference between committees of the two houses produced a bill that contained elements of both the House and the Senate versions. The bill, as finally passed, provides a support price of 90 per cent of parity for five basic commodities through 1950. In 1951 the Secretary of Agriculture can work within a scale of 80 to 90 per cent. After that, the Anderson sliding-scale system, which provides props at 75 to 90 per cent of parity, will operate. Two parity formulas, one based on the years 1909-1914, and the other on the past ten years, will be used. The one most favorable to any particular crop will be utilized.

In the final vote on the compromise version of the farm bill, the opposition was confined mostly to Republicans. In the actual debates in both houses, Senators and Congressmen continued to speak out for their favorite plans. Urban elements expressed their opposition to the whole theory of price supports on the grounds that it raises the cost of living for the consumer. Rigid price support adherents fought it out with the flexible price support champions. Members from agricultural states fought for higher supports for their home-state products. There were even some elements of mid-Western isolationism present.

FORUM presents below excerpts from the House debate on the compromise farm bill:[1]

* * * *

Mr. PACE, Democrat, Georgia.

. . . . . .

The bill breaks down the some 200 or more agricultural commodities into four classes; the basics, the storable nonbasics, some five or six special nonbasics, and then all other agricultural commodities.

Now, as to the basics, which are cotton, corn, wheat, rice, tobacco and peanuts, the bill provides that the producer shall enjoy a support price not in excess of 90 per cent, with some exceptions which I will mention, nor less than 75 per cent of parity. Then there are included in the bill, to be found in sections 101 (a) and (b) on page 2 of the committee report, certain tables which fix

[1] The *Congressional Record*, House, Vol. 95, No. 196, pp. 15254-15268.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

minimums between 75 and 90 per cent, depending upon the supply. I should like to make it clear at this point and I hope to have an opportunity to refer to it later, that it is the distinct purpose of the tables to do no more than fix the lowest possible minimum levels of support and not the maximum.

As to the basics, the bill provides that next year, 1950, the support price, when they are under control, that is, under acreage allotments or marketing quotas, shall be 90 per cent of parity. Then in the next year, 1951, if still under controls, it shall be not less than 80 per cent of parity. That, of course, was done, as was stated in the statement of the managers on the part of the House, in order to be sure to cushion the fall in the support level under the general terms of the bill.

A new parity formula, which goes into effect under this bill, known as the 10-year moving average, would drastically cut the parity price of some commodities and to keep that from coming about immediately, the bill provides that for the basic commodities during the next four years the Secretary shall use as the support price the parity index which is the highest under either the current parity formula, or under the new parity formula contained in the bill. That is a further cushion against any drastic drop in prices.

The bill then provides that if the producers are asked to go under marketing quotas and they disapprove by two-thirds majority, then their support prices will drop to 50 per cent of parity.

Those are the general provisions of the bill as to the basic commodities.

We also have in the bill what is a new grouping of commodities, which has not been in previous legislation, known as storable nonbasic commodities. While I shall not try to mention them all, they are, for example, such commodities as oats, rye, barley, grain sorghums, soybeans and commodities which, like wheat and cotton, can be stored without serious loss.

As to those the bill provides that when production of those commodities are either under marketing quotas or under a marketing agreement or order, they too, shall be supported at not in excess of 90 per cent of parity nor less than the level shown in the table which you will find in section 302 on page 4 of the conference report. . . .

Then there are certain nonbasic commodities which are specially treated in the bill. The first is wool. Its support price shall be from 60 per cent to 90 per cent, the level to be determined by the Secretary as necessary to encourage the production of 360,000,000 pounds of shorn wool in this country.

The next three commodities are honey, Irish potatoes, and tung nuts. The bill provides they shall be supported at from 60 per cent to 90 per cent.

The next are dairy products, which are of great importance from the stand-point of value of all agricultural commodities in the United States. Whole milk, butterfat and the products thereof shall be supported at from 75 per cent to 90 per cent, the level to be determined by the Secretary as necessary in order to assure an adequate supply.

Then there remains that great field, all other commodities, such as fresh fruits, vegetables, and commodities of that kind. They are to be supported at from zero per cent to 90 per cent of parity. The Secretary determines the level of support, the terms and the conditions and the extent to which such operations are to be carried out in this type of support-price program.

In making the determination whether the producers who produce that type of commodity shall enjoy from zero to 90, these are the factors that the Secretary must take into consideration:

First, the level at which competing commodities are supported. The supply in relation to the demand; the levels at which other commodities are being supported, and, in case of feed grains, the feed value of such grains in relation to corn; the availability of funds; the perishability of the commodity, the importance of the commodity to agriculture and the national economy; ability to dispose of stocks acquired by the government; the need for offsetting temporary losses of exports; the ability and willingness of producers to keep supplies in line with demand, that is, the compliance with marketing quotas, acreage allotments, production goals, and marketing practices. . . .

Here are the other principle provisions of

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the bill: The Secretary may raise the support above 90 per cent in only two instances, in both of which there must be public hearings. One is where it is essential in order to secure an increased supply for the national welfare, and the other is to increase and maintain higher production in the interest of national security.

In all support programs appropriate adjustments are required to be made as to grade, types, staple, quantity, location, and other factors. In the case of cotton, 7/8-inch Middling shall be the standard grade for purposes of parity and price support.

The bill provides that the commodity shall be the sole security for loans under the support program. If practicable, that is, if he has the information as to the approximate acreage to be planted, and the average yields in the past, or other means of estimating the anticipated yields, the Secretary must announce to the producers the support price before planting time. After being so announced to the producers the support may not be reduced. That, of course, is a matter of great importance to producers, in order that they may know before they pitch the crop what the support level will be.

SURPLUSES

Now, this is very imporant to many members. The question was raised: What is the government going to do with the surpluses they now have on hand? The bill authorizes the Commodity Credit Corporation to sell commodities it has acquired and which have not deteriorated. It sets up the pattern under which they may be sold. They might sell such commodities, but in doing so they must establish policies that will not discourage or deter manufacturers, processors, and dealers from acquiring and carrying normal inventories of the current crop.

. . . . . .

So, in selling these commodities back into the market, the price must be fixed at a high enough level that buyers will not stand by and let the government take over the whole crop and then come to Washington to get their supplies. It must be maintained at a level where the ordinary businessman will buy his own needs in the market.

The bill then provides that they shall not set such commodities at less than five per cent above the current support price, plus reasonable carrying charges. Of course, you understand it would never do to take surplus commodities owned by the government and dump them into the market and break either the support price or the prevailing market price at the time.

The bill defines basic and nonbasic agricultural commodities, supply percentages, total supply, carry-over, normal supply, and other terms. The bill does something that this committee has been seeking for the last ten years; it provides that in determinations under the new parity formula, in arriving at the parity index, there shall be taken into account wages paid hired workers.

. . . . . .

Mr. COUDERT, Republican, New York. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

. . . . . .

Mr. PACE. Not now; I am sorry.

What does the farmer get from the increase, the doubling of the benefits under social security? He gets only one thing, the privilege of paying for it; that is all. When men rise here—I do not care who they are—and tell me that the people they serve are against this bill they do not know whereof they speak, because the time has come—Listen to me. The farmers of this nation have learned that if they are going to sell their commodities to people in New York City the people in that city must have regular work and make a good wage; and I believe that the people in New York City know that if they are going to sell their manufactured products that the farm people must have good prices and stable incomes in order to buy those products.

. . . . . .

Mr. ROONEY, Democrat, New York. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. PACE. I yield.

Mr. ROONEY. Does the gentleman realize that social security is paid for by the employee and the employer? Is the gentleman comparing that with funds paid out of the public treasury?

Mr. PACE. No, I am not.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Mr. COOLEY, Democrat, North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PACE. I yield.

Mr. COOLEY. Does not the gentleman know that it all goes into the total cost the farmer has to pay when he purchases an article manufactured in the city?

Mr. PACE. Everyone should agree to that; that is what I am talking about.

Mr. Speaker, I do not seek differences here; I am trying to find a common ground. I am trying to show that the man in the city should have and must have a sympathetic interest in the income and welfare of the farmers. There is a movement under way in this country today to add to the cost of manufactured goods the cost of a pension for all the workers in industry. This the farmers must pay in part every time they buy a manufactured article.

Another item in this bill which will be of great benefit to the teeming millions of the gentleman's city is the more liberal use of section 32 funds, that is, money received from import duties; that they must be used principally in disposing of the perishable commodities which the cities consume in such great quantities, that is, these funds can be used to make those commodities cheaper to the city people.

The next section repeals section 302 of what is known as the Aiken Act or the Agricultural Act of 1948, which was the support-price section and the heart of the Aiken bill. This repeal should please every farmer in the country.

The next section authorizes the Bank for Cooperatives to make loans under certain conditions to farmer cooperatives up to 80 per cent of the cost for the construction of agricultural storage structures, that is, for the storage of agricultural commodities. But it provides that they cannot construct refrigerating units nor can they make these loans in communities which are already adequately served by storage facilities.

Now let me turn to the section in which many of you are interested. The Senate bill carried a provision for giving away agricultural commodities owned by the Commodity Credit Corporation which were about to spoil. For example, Irish potatoes. Instead of letting those commodities spoil this bill provides, not merely Irish potatoes but any agricultural commodity which is deteriorating and is about to spoil, that the Commodity Credit Corporation and the Secretary of Agriculture can give them first, to the Munitions Board or to any other federal agency to be used in furthering the purchase of some commodity not produced in the United States. Secondly, they shall be given to the school-lunch program, to the Bureau of Indian Affairs, to any federal, state, or local public-welfare organization, for assistance to needy Indians and other needy persons. Those are public institutions and they shall be given away in that order. Third, to private-welfare organizations for the assistance of needy persons in the United States. A lot of you have received telegrams from C.A.R.E. and C.R.O.P. and other similar organizations. Fourth, if there is any remaining, they are given to private-welfare organizations for assistance of needy persons outside of the United States. No organization is named. In order to receive any, these organizations must give such commodities to needy persons outside of the United States.

Mr. Speaker, let me say that results under this bill are going to depend upon its administration. We have provided in the bill and the conference report clearly states that the Secretary of Agriculture shall have full discretion in determining the level of support for the basic commodities up above the minimums fixed in the tables. As you go home I think it is important that you and those whom you serve understand that the tables are nothing but minima and there is full discretion in the Secretary of Agriculture to go above them up to 90 per cent of parity regardless of the tables and regardless of the factors set forth in section 401 in this bill.

. . . . . .

We believe it is the duty and responsibility of the Secretary of Agriculture to protect and support the general welfare of the farmers, to raise and maintain their standard of living, and to see that they have the purchasing power necessary to provide a constant and ready market for manufactured and industrial goods.

. . . . . .

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Mr. COUDERT. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PACE. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. COUDERT. I thank the gentleman for yielding to me. I was a little afraid the gentleman was going to permit his assumption of representation of my district to stand and deprive the metropolitan area of an opportunity to be heard.

The gentleman has spoken of the income enjoyed by the great consumer population which I have the honor to represent. Let me ask the gentleman where in the statutes of the United States the consumer population of my area are guaranteed 90 per cent of income return for their goods and services that they would need to put them on a par with farmers?

Mr. PACE. Let me say this to the gentleman—hear me, please, because I am stating facts as I have found them—that if the farmers and farm workers of this nation enjoyed a minimum wage of 75 cents an hour, the support price would be considerably above 90 per cent of parity. The price at which a farmer sells his commodity only reflects his costs and the wages that he and his sons and daughters and hired workers receive for work in the field from sunup to sundown. I respectfully submit to my distinguished friend from New York, and I was never more sincere in my life, that when his people enjoy a minimum wage of 75 cents an hour, they are at the hands of this Congress enjoying greater protection than we today propose to throw around the people who work in the fields.

In conclusion I should like to have inserted in the RECORD at this point under the authority granted me, the table used by the members of the conference in judging the different parity prices and support levels under the House bill, the Senate bill, and the Agricultural Act of 1948;

Specified commodities: Estimated maximum support levels for 1950 based on parity index for July 15, 1949, and estimated average prices received by farmers, 1940-49

Commodity	Unit	90 per cent present parity (Gore bill)	90 per cent, title II, 1948 act (Aiken Act)		90 per cent, title II, 1948 act, including wage rates [1] (Anderson plan)		Income support standard (Brannan plan)
			Including transitional [2]	Excluding transitional [3]	Including transitional [2]	Excluding transitional [3]	
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Basic commodities:							
Wheat	Bushel	$1.94	$1.84	$1.62	$1.84	$1.71	$1.86
Corn	do	1.41	1.34	1.29	1.36		1.45
Cotton	Pound	.2723	.2587	.2418	.2587	.2557	.2776
Rice	Bushel	1.78	1.96		2.07		2.24
Peanuts	Pound	.105	.100	.081	.100	.085	.0937
Tobacco:							
Flue-cured	do	.422	.428		.453		.487
Burley	do	.410	.435		.460		.490
Nonbasic commodities:							
Butterfat	do	.578	.586		.657		.663
Milk, wholesale	Hundredweight	3.51	3.69		4.09		4.19
Hogs	do	15.90	16.60		17.50		18.80
Eggs	Dozen	.472	.448	.400	.448	.423	.454
Chickens	Pound	.250	.257		.272		.288
Flaxseed	Bushel	3.71	3.78		3.99		4.27
Soybeans	do	2.11	2.24		2.37		2.52
Beans, dry edible	Hundredweight	7.40	7.44		7.87		8.38
Potatoes	Bushel	1.61	1.53	1.40	1.53	1.47	1.57
Beef cattle	Hundredweight	11.90	14.70		15.60		16.70
Lambs	do	12.90	15.80		17.00		18.20
Oats	Bushel	.877	.833	.731	.833	.773	.818
Barley	do	1.36	1.29	1.08	1.29	1.14	1.21
Apples	do	2.11	2.31		2.44		2.59
Wool	Pound	.402	.446		.471		.492
Oranges	Box	3.29	3.13	1.94	3.13	2.05	2.06

[1] Adjusted base prices for beef cattle, lambs, milk, and butterfat include wartime subsidy payments. Farm wage rates combined with the present parity index. Farm wage rates are weighted 7.8 per cent and the present parity index is weighted 92.2 per cent.

[2] Transitional parity prices for 1950 are 95 per cent of parity prices according to the present formula. Transitional parity prices would apply for wheat, corn, cotton, peanuts, eggs, potatoes, oats, barley, and oranges in column 2. For all these commodities except corn transitional parity prices also apply in column 5.

[3] Prices appear in these columns only for those commodities for which the transitional parity price is higher than the parity price according to the new formula. The transitional parity prices appear in columns 2 and 4. Prices in columns 3 and 5 are parity prices according to the new formulas disregarding the transitional feature.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

. . . . . .

Mr. LANHAM, Democrat, Georgia.

. . . . . .

Congressman Steve Pace, of the Third District of Georgia, and the man who has done more than any other, without exception, for the farmers of Georgia and the South, sponsored, and I voted for, a bill that would have continued your support price of cotton at near 100 per cent of parity. It has been referred to by some as the Brannan-plan bill. This is not correct. Nobody knew what the Brannan plan would cost, nor what its effects would be. On the other hand, many of us, including the gentleman from Georgia, Congressman Pace, knew that for the government to continue to support perishable farm products, such as potatoes, milk, and eggs, as at present, and for the government to continue to allow potatoes to rot and dried eggs to spoil, would mean a black eye for the entire support program. We knew, too, that it would mean in the end the destruction of the entire price-support program. This would mean disaster to the farmers of Georgia.

PACE BILL

Knowing these things, and having the best interest of the farmers at heart, the gentleman from Georgia [MR. PACE], after months of study by his subcommittee of the whole problem, included in his bill power for the Secretary of Agriculture to try his suggested method of supporting prices on farm products that could not be stored, by letting the products sell on the market at a price that would be determined by the law of supply and demand, and then to make up the difference to farmers by a payment from the Treasury. This would have meant lower prices for the consumer, which would have stimulated demand, and would have kept the market in sound condition. It would also have allowed people who needed potatoes and eggs to use them instead of allowing them to rot. The idea of the gentleman from Georgia [MR. PACE] and his committee was to try the plan to see whether or not it would work. If so, it could next year be extended to other perishable or nonstorage crops. If not, it could have been discontinued. In this way the gentleman from Georgia [MR. PACE] and the majority of his committee members thought the price support program might be saved. It sounded like good sense to try the plan, and I therefore supported the gentleman from Georgia [MR. PACE] and his bill.

Remember, this had nothing to do with cotton, corn, wheat, and other crops that can be stored. The Pace bill did not propose subsidy payments for these crops, but would have been used only on the two crops, potatoes, eggs, and shorn wool. So you see the Pace bill would not have changed in any way the present support price of cotton, corn, or wheat. And it was just a trial on the eggs and potatoes to see whether Mr. Brannan, the Secretary of Agriculture, had hit upon a solution to the puzzling problem of giving the farmer a fair price for his crops that cannot be stored because they spoil or rot quickly, without wasting these crops that people need, and which should not be destroyed. The Pace bill was defeated.

The House then passed a bill known as the Gore bill to continue present price supports on staple crops, which would maintain the present support price of 29 cents on cotton and repeal the Aiken bill. In the Senate a compromise bill was passed allowing the Secretary of Agriculture to reduce the support price to 75 per cent of parity. This is known as the Anderson bill and is the same thing as the Aiken bill except that "it wears a new pair of socks," as Vice President BARKLEY says. Remember, the original Aiken bill, which would have gone into effect on January 1, 1950, unless we had repealed it, would have reduced the price of cotton still lower.

At long last, the conference committee appointed to iron out the differences between the House bill to continue price support on staple farm products at 90 per cent of parity and the Senate bill which would permit the lowering of support prices to as low as 75 per cent of parity, has agreed upon a compromise. This compromise bill would continue present price support at 90 per cent of parity for the next year, at 80 to 90 per cent of parity for 1951 and from 75 to 90 per cent for the next 2 years. Since this bill will continue 90 per cent support prices for the year 1950, I voted for the conference report rather than let the Aiken bill go into effect on Janu-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ary 1, 1950. Besides, the bill finally agreed upon establishes a new formula for determining parity which is more favorable to the farmer since it includes the cost of farm labor. The House members of the conference committee, headed by our own Congressman STEPHEN PACE, of the Third Georgia District, are to be congratulated on winning such a victory for the farmers of the South.

. . . . . .

I have insisted that since parity means only a fair price for the farmer, his staple crops should be supported at 100 per cent of parity. Why should the farmer be asked to accept anything less than a fair price for his products? Why should anyone agree to less than 90 per cent at the lowest for farm-price supports? I have refused to agree to any such compromise. The Pace bill for which I voted would have supported farm prices on staple farm crops at 100 per cent of parity. This is another reason I voted for it.

The Aiken farm bill was passed in the dying hours of the Eightieth Congress, early Sunday morning just before the Republican Party held its national convention in Philadelphia in June, 1948. Word had come down from the Republican big shots in Philadelphia that the bill must be passed before adjournment. The bill had passed the Senate, where it was introduced and sponsored by Senator AIKEN, of Vermont.

The House Committee on Agriculture had never studied the bill. Yet it was accepted by a Republican-controlled conference committee and submitted to the House for a vote after an all-night session. One Republican member, the gentleman from Wisconsin [MR. MURRAY], was so incensed with his own party that he resigned from the conference committee rather than be a party to the passage of the bill. Before reporting it, the Democrats on the committee, led by our own gentleman from Georgia [MR. PACE], got the effective date of the bill postponed until January 1, 1950. Even with this provision, every Democrat in the House voted against the bill, and every Republican, with the exception of the gentleman from Wisconsin [MR. MURRAY] and the gentleman from South Dakota [MR. CASE], voted for the bill.

This bill would have been ruinous to the South if it had become a law, even if it had been amended to make support prices 75 to 90 per cent of parity instead of 60 to 90 per cent of parity. I say it would have been ruinous because it would have allowed the Secretary of Agriculture to support the staple crops —corn, cotton, tobacco, and wheat—at 75 per cent of parity instead of 90 per cent of parity as at present. This would have meant a support price for cotton of around 22 cents instead of 29 cents as at present.

During the war years the government was able to support prices without any loss to the Treasury due to the abnormal demand for farm products. Now that demand is slackening and supplies have increased so that we have a big surplus of many crops, it is absolutely necessary that future production on the farm be controlled.

So the present Congress has passed a law providing for a limitation on acreage to be planted to cotton and other staple crops coming under the price-support program.

Such a bill is always unpopular, and because of the many differences in farming conditions throughout our country occasionally works a hardship on some section of the country or some individual farmer. Yet the law is absolutely necessary if the farm-support-price program is to be continued.

. . . . . .

Mr. KEATING, Republican, New York. Mr. Speaker, it is proposed by this compromise to postpone the shift over from a rigid to a flexible price-support program. Without the passage of this measure, this desirable change, so essential to our national well-being, would take place next January 1. If it is a good thing for four years from now, why not now?

DISADVANTAGES

While this measure is concededly a vast improvement over the original vote-buying scheme of the Secretary of Agriculture it still represents an effort to postpone sound economics at the expense of the public welfare. It means a continuation of extravagant government purchase of certain favored commodities. It spells further huge government surpluses, purchased at a high price and destroyed or given away. It discriminates against the growers of those farm products which do not command sufficient political sup-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

port to accomplish their inclusion on the favored list. It guarantees that the consumer will have no relief within the indefinite future from present artificially inflated food and clothing costs. It continues all of the abuses which have characterized the rigid price support practices of the past with mounting indignation on the part of those who must foot the bill.

Finally, with the exception of a small but powerful group of large western and southern-land owners, it injures more than it helps the long range interest of the farmers of this country. It subjects them to a governmental control and regulation over their property and their lives through acreage controls, marketing quotas, and all the rest of the government package of rules, regulations, forms, and restraints. It makes chattels of the state out of one of the most stable and stalwart segments of our citizenry. Under the guise of protecting agriculture, it hastens and fortifies the likelihood of violent adverse reaction to any sound, constructive agricultural program.

In summary, it harms everybody, the taxpayer, the consumer, and the farmer. It is a craven and irresponsible effort to purchase votes with public funds. It should be defeated, thereby permitting the farm program already enacted to go into effect the first of next year. This provides a sensible varying floor of agricultural price supports directly related to the supply of each commodity. The greater the supply, the lower the support price. Only thereby can a curb be imposed on the understandable temptation of the cotton, wheat, and tobacco growers to produce huge surpluses for purchases out of the hard-earned pay envelopes of our people. Farmers should be encouraged to produce, it is true, but for the market, not for what they can get from the government for their products.

Further procrastination in enacting a sound farm program, the pledge of both political parties, as opposed to a political booby trap, can only result in making chronic and progressively more dangerous the present disordered, expensive, and discriminatory practices. We should have the fortitude and foresight to call a halt now by rejection of this misnamed compromise.

. . . . . .

Mr. H. CARL ANDERSEN, Republican, Minnesota. Mr. Speaker, I am opposed to this conference report. In my estimation its provision for a sliding scale of supports on farm commodities is an invitation to an agricultural depression. The farmer will not be able to operate on 75 per cent of parity in 1952, as provided in this legislation, any more than he could do so today. Congress would show just as much logic if it passed a bill calling for a 25-per cent reduction, over a 3-year period, in the wages of everyone working for hire in the nation.

Under this measure we are asked to approve this afternoon, there is no mandatory support for hogs, the sale of which constituted at least one-seventh of the total income of the farmers of the country this past year.

. . . . . .

On January 27, 1948 just before the first real postwar break in farm prices which occurred in February, 1948, I introduced a bill to extend the 90-per cent price-support floors for a period of two years. I felt that a two year extension of the 90 per cent supports would remove our vital agricultural policy from politics in the election year, which was then just commencing. The Congress refused to accept this two year extension but a one year extension was voted by the House through what is known as the Hope bill, the law under which we are operating today. Unfortunately, however, the Senate insisted on the adoption of the so-called Aiken bill, which would have become law on January 1, 1950 but for the fact that this past summer the House voted, almost unanimously, to repeal the Aiken act and to reenact the 90 per cent price support floor. This was exactly in line with my proposal to the House which I introduced this past March. Mr. Speaker, I sincerely regret that politics and unwarranted interference from labor and consumer groups who are clamoring for cheap food have so colored the picture that it is impossible to secure justice for the many millions of farmers in this nation through the adoption of a good permanent farm program. After hearing and reading the rosy promises of the leaders of the administration made to the farmers at election time, they must certainly be chagrined

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to have to admit that the best program this Democrat-controlled Congress can produce is this conference report we have before us today. I repeat, Mr. Speaker, I cannot, in good conscience, vote for this legislation.

. . . . . .

Mr. GROSS, Republican, Iowa.

. . . . . .

To those members of the House, particularly those who represent the centers of population in the eastern seaboard area, who never miss an opportunity to scream about high food costs when farm legislation is being considered, let me say that you would do well to sweep off your own doorsteps before trying to dust off the farmers.

Only a few weeks ago Iowa farmers were being compelled to sell their eggs for about 45 cents a dozen, but at the very same time those eggs were selling in New York City for $1 a dozen. Is anyone stupid enough to believe that it costs any substantial part of that tremendous differential to transport eggs by the truck or carload from Iowa to New York City? And it should be kept in mind that the support price for eggs is only 35 cents a dozen so that no part of the high cost of eggs to consumers can be blamed on support-price legislation.

It may well be asked why the city or state governments of the eastern-seaboard area have never taken action to wipe out this unconscionable spread between the prices received by producers and prices paid by consumers. Is it because there exists in those cities and states a combine so powerful politically that it can go on indefinitely bleeding extortionate profits from consumers?

Instead of these municipal and state governments ascertaining who is victimizing who and why, then using legal procedures that are readily available, their representatives come to Washington venting their ire upon farmers who never have had a full voice in determining a fair return for their services and their toil.

The measure we have before us here today is not good permanent-farm legislation. I say again that it is with the greatest reluctance that I am compelled, under the circumstances of the imminence of adjournment, to support it.

. . . . . .

Mr. LEMKE, Nonpartisan, North Dakota.

. . . . . .

Just prior to the election last November, Secretary of Agriculture Brannan, at Albert Lea, Minnesota, told the farmers of the nation over the radio that if Dewey were elected agricultural prices would tumble. Dewey was not elected, but agricultural prices have tumbled. The truth was that at that very moment agricultural prices were tumbling, and the Secretary was largely responsible for their tumbling. In fact, he was just making an excuse. He added insult to injury. He assumed that the farmer was so gullible as not to know what was going on.

FOREIGN DUMPING

The Secretary and his administration were responsible for the reciprocal trade agreements. Unfortunately for agriculture, some farm leaders—not the farmers—were foolish enough to swallow this betrayal. Then last fall, under these agreements, Canadian potatoes were shipped into this country and sold below the $2 per hundred pounds support price. As a result the American potatoes accumulated while our people were eating the cheaper Canadian potatoes.

Then, even before the ballots were counted, Secretary Brannan lowered the support price, but not low enough to prevent Canadian potatoes from entering under these agreements. As a result the government, under the support price, bought the high-grade American potatoes and later in the year dumped and destroyed millions of bushels, while the consumer had to pay high prices and be satisfied with the poorer grades.

Now that the war-torn nations are recovering, the result of these reciprocal trade agreements will come back with a vengeance. Foreign agricultural products, produced by slave and underpaid labor, are already entering the American market. The growers of pecans and walnuts are bitterly complaining. They cannot compete in producing these products in competition with the slave and underpaid labor of other countries.

. . . . . .

Now Secretary Brannan attempts to make the farmer the shock absorber of this disastrous foreign policy. He attempts to flim-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

flam the farmers and the consumer by telling them that he has a plan by which he could reduce the cost of living by regimenting and subsidizing the farmer. Nothing could be further from the truth. Under this plan, the farmer is to sell his products in the open market in competition with the world and, according to the Secretary, in that way reduce the cost of living.

Then to lull the farmer asleep, the Secretary tells him that he will pay the difference between the world market and the Brannan 100 per cent parity. This parity is 9 cents less per bushel of wheat than 90 per cent, and 29 cents less than 100 per cent parity under the present law.

When the Secretary sprung this deceptive program on the public, every farm organization but one, and many of the locals of that organization and individual members, rejected it. These farm leaders, local organizations and individual members sent telegrams and letters to their representatives in Congress repudiating the Brannan plan. They insisted upon the repeal of the Hope-Aiken law and demanded 100 per cent parity under the present law.

When the Secretary appeared before the House Committee on Agriculture, it also repudiated him. It threw his faked scheme into the wastebasket and started to draft a bill of its own.

. . . . . .

I know the Secretary says he will pay the farmer the difference between the world market and his 100 per cent parity.

The farmer is not fooled. He knows that in order to do this, the Secretary will have to get the money by appropriations. It will have to be raised by taxation. The farmers as a group pay a large part of the taxes. I have yet to find a farmer, who understands it, who is for that part of the Brannan program. If carried to its logical conclusion that program would require an appropriation each year for agriculture of $18,000,000,000. This amount is so staggering that anyone with common horse sense knows that Congress would never appropriate it.

Neither can Brannan fool the consumer at the expense of the farmer. He too is a taxpayer. Both the farmer and the consumer know that for every dollar they receive in subsidies or lower cost of living via taxation, they will have to pay $2. The extra dollar will be for the collectors and distributors of the tax and for interest and overhead expenses.

The farmer knows that because of our large indebtedness, appropriations will be hard to get even though they come out of his and the consumers' tax dollar. He knows that the farm population has decreased from 30,000,000 in 1930 to 24,000,000 in 1948, while the general population has increased 20,000,000. He knows that as a result his strength in Congress has been reduced from one-third to one-seventh. He knows that he must get permanent legislation—100 per cent real parity or better still, 100 per cent cost of production.

During the 14 years that I have been a member of Congress, the farmer has been made the political football. During those 14 years, about all that he got from either party was lip service, and occasionally subsistence help.

No permanent farm legislation has been passed. We gave him so-called parity. We started in with 65 per cent, then 75 per cent, then 85 per cent and finally 90 per cent parity-support prices. There never was any reason why we should not have given agriculture a fair break—10 per cent real parity—100 per cent justice—better still, cost of production. This as a floor, not as a ceiling.

It is for this reason that I again introduced the cost-of-production bill H. R. 1686. This bill is the combined work of many members of Congress and farm leaders. It was first introduced in 1933. Since then it has been improved and re-introduced in every session of Congress. This is the final and streamlined twentieth revision. While Congress has just extended, with some modifications, the present Support Price Act, the final solution of the agricultural problem must be cost of production. We will eventually get it, why not now?

If that kind of a bill had been passed, then the farmer would be getting about $2.70 for a bushel of wheat today, and comparable prices for his other products. That would allow him and his family the average wage that those working in industry get for the time they labor—about 57 cents an hour. Surely no honest person can object to the farmer getting

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

paid for his labor the same as his brothers and sisters working in industry are paid.

The farmer is not responsible for the high cost of living. Let us stop camouflaging. The high taxes, as a result of our international flirtations, are alone responsible for at least 125 per cent increase in the cost of living.

. . . . . .

Mr. HOPE, Republican, Kansas. Mr. Speaker, if I have time to yield after I have completed my statement, I will be very happy to do so, but I do not desire to yield until then.

Mr. Speaker, from what has been said in the course of this debate I am sure there is a misapprehension on the part of some of the members representing city districts as to the effect which this bill will have upon their constituents. And, I can understand why there should be that apprehension, if they read *The Washington Post* this morning, because it carries a big headline half across the top of the page saying, "Price supports highest ever." Then the article begins as follows:

"Senate and House conferees on a farm bill yesterday unanimously agreed on a new measure to give the nation's farmers the highest schedule of price supports ever granted even in wartime."

Let me say in the very beginning of my remarks that there absolutely is not a word of truth in that statement or the headline and I hope that if *The Washington Post* proceeds now to carry its customary editorial atacking the farmers of this nation it will not base that editorial upon the entirely false and misleading statements contained in its news columns this morning. I hope also if that editorial is written it will call attention to the fact that this Congress has practically doubled the minimum wage rates in this country, that the salaries of every one of the thousands of government workers in Washington have been increased not only this year but last year and in other recent years, that we have passed bills providing for extensive public housing subsidies and that the House has passed legislation greatly increasing social-security benefits. I hope also that it will comment upon those things in exactly the same vein it comments upon the farm price support bill which we are passing today and that it will correct the error in its news columns and point out correctly that this bill reduces price supports lower than they have been any time since before the war.

In support of that statement and in refutation of the inaccurate and misleading article contained in this morning's *Washington Post,* I desire to call attention to just what this country had in the way of price supports, first, during the war; second, during the year 1949; and, third, the rates contained in this bill.

During the war period prices were supported on more than a hundred agricultural commodities. On the six basic commodities prices were fixed by law at 90 per cent of parity with the exception of cotton on which the supports were 92½ per cent of parity. On the group of commodities known as the Steagall commodities price supports were mandatory at not less than 90 per cent of parity and in some cases they were fixed at over 100 per cent. Under the law these mandatory price supports were in effect until December 31, 1948.

WARTIME

Among the Steagall commodities which were required by law to be supported at not less than 90 per cent of parity were hogs, eggs, chickens, turkeys, milk and butterfat, dry peas of certain varieties, edible beans of certain varieties, soy beans for oil, flaxseed for oil, peanuts for oil, Anglo-Egyptian cotton, potatoes, and sweet potatoes. Thus, during the war period five of the basic commodities were required to be supported at 90 per cent of parity. One, cotton, was required to be supported at 92½ per cent and 13 Steagall commodities which I have enumerated were required to be supported at not less than 90 per cent of parity and many of them were supported at a considerably higher rate. In addition, as already stated, the Commodity Credit Corporation under its general powers supported the price of something like a hundred additional commodities including wool. Price supports on this large number of commodities, however, were not required by any specific legislation passed by Congress.

Under the 1949 act now in effect supports at 90 per cent of parity were required upon the six basic commodities of wheat, corn, cot-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ton, rice, tobacco, and peanuts, and upon milk and its products, hogs, chickens, and eggs. Wool was required to be supported at the level at which it was supported during the war. In addition price supports at from 60 per cent to 90 per cent of parity were made mandatory upon turkeys, dry peas of certain varieties, edible beans of certain varieties, soy beans for oil, flaxseed for oil, peanuts for oil, Anglo-Egyptian cotton, potatoes, and sweetpotatoes.

The act in effect in 1949 further declared it to be the policy of the Congress that the lending and purchasing operations of the Department of Agriculture should be carried out during the year 1949 in such a way as to bring the price and income of the producers of agricultural commodities, other than those which I have just enumerated, to a fair parity relationship with the enumerated commodities to the extent that funds were available.

. . . . . .

It will thus be seen that a comparison of the levels of price support which were in effect during the war, during 1949, and under the provisions of the bill shows definitely that price supports in general were higher and that mandatory price supports existed on a far larger number of commodities during both periods than under this bill.

. . . . . .

Mr. JAVITS, Republican, New York. Farm income, it is my recollection has gone up from $9,000,000,000 per year before the war to over $30,000,000,000 per year currently, so you cannot blame city Representatives from raising these question, while the wages of factory workers have about doubled in the same period. City people want a good economic basis for farm people and will support reasonable farm programs. They do not, however, want the relationship to get entirely out of hand between city income and farm-product prices.

Mr. HOPE. May I reply to the gentleman by saying that the income of the average person living on a farm in this country, earning his livelihood by farming, is less than half of the non farm per capita income. To be exact the respective figures were $712 and $1,617. So the gentleman from New York is representing a constituency which, if it is an average constituency, is receiving more than double the average income of the farmers of this country.

Mr. JAVITS. Will the gentleman just yield for one further point?

The gentleman does not dispute the overall figure that farm income has quadrupled from 1939?

Mr. HOPE. And the average income of the farmer is still only about two-fifths of the average income of the nonfarmer. Furthermore, as compared with pre-war, food prices have not advanced as fast as consumer income. In other words the same percentage of income will buy more food today than before the war. Wage rates and pension benefits are still going up but food prices are coming down.

. . . . . .

Mr. BECKWORTH, Democrat, Texas. Thank you, Mr. MURRAY, for yielding to me. This is, indeed, considerate of you.

It was my contention as the debate on the cotton quota legislation August 3, 1949, proceeded that not enough consideration was given to the small family-size farmer such as the veteran who had been away or the small family-size farmer who had worked in a defense plant or the successor of the defense plant. I refer, of course, to a genuine farmer found so to be by the county agricultural committee of the respective county. Many of these farmers, genuine farmers they are, are at home now. They deserve a fair deal as to peanuts and cotton and other crop quotas. This fair deal they must have. I offered several amendments August 3. They were opposed. I quote some of the statements made about changing the cotton quota bill then.

I quote Representative PACE, one who has worked on the cotton quota bill diligently. His remarks are on page 10920:

> Mr. PACE. Mr. Speaker, the sentiments expressed here by the distinguished gentleman from Texas have motivated his entire service in the Congress. That is, his interest in the family-sized small farm. It gives me pleasure to tell him that there has never been a bill, such as that now before the House, which concerns itself so much with the welfare of the family-size farm.

. . . . . .

Already the cotton quota bill is being amended—less than three months after the

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

passage of the 1949 cotton quota bill. I am not surprised. My remarks of August 3 establish clearly that I would not be surprised. To give the small family-size cotton farmer a fair deal, it should be amended some more—at least to the extent he can earn a living. I refer only to genuine cotton farmers, cotton farmers found so to be by their County Agricultural Committees. Be it recalled I emphasized this when I spoke several times August 3, 1949. My amendments of that date disclose this as my meaning.

Yes, the 1949 cotton quota bill is being amended today.

The amendment was offered originally in the Senate by Senator ANDERSON. It is on page 14609—in the middle of the page—of the October 12, 1949, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

Here is the amendment. It was not explained.

> Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. President, I have an amendment which is on the desk, and which I ask to have stated.
>
> The VICE PRESIDENT. The Secretary will state the amendment.
>
> The amendment was, on page 23, after line 4, to insert the following:
>
> "SEC. —. Section 344 (f) (3) of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, as amended by Public Law 272, Eighty-first Congress, is amended (i) by striking the figure '10' in the first sentence and inserting therefor the figure '15', and (ii) by striking the figure '30' in the proviso and inserting therefor the figure '20'."

I have not heard it explained today; it is found on the last page of the conference report we have before us today. The report is not numbered but accompanies H. R. 5345.

I sought an explanation and include the explanation at this point.

> DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
>
> *Washington, D. C., October 17, 1949.*
>
> Hon. LINDLEY BECKWORTH,
>
> *House of Representatives.*
>
> DEAR MR. BECKWORTH: This is with reference to your letter of October 13, 1949, relating to an amendment being submitted pertaining to subsection (f) 3 of section 344 of Public Law 272, Eighty-first Congress.
>
> This amendment proposed to increase the reserve which county committees may withhold for specified use and adjustments from 10 to 15 per cent and, changing the percentage of any such reserve withheld, for use in adjusting allotments otherwise computed between 5 and 15 acres from 30 to 20 per cent.
>
> The Department, in its work this year with the Congress pertaining to the cotton-acreage allotment and marketing-quota legislation, has consistently recommended greater flexibility in the allotment procedures by providing adequate reserves for the state and county production and marketing administration committees to use in making specified adjustments which mathematical formulas so often fail to recognize.
>
> This amendment does provide additional flexibility to the county committee by making it possible for them to have more acreage to adjust allotments below 5 acres and above 15 acres and does not alter the acreage that they would have for adjustments for allotments between 5 and 15 acres. Also, such amendment, by increasing the reserve from which new farm allotments may be made, would, if the committees so provided, make more acreage available for this use. The Department, therefore, feels that such an amendment is desirable.
>
> Sincerely yours,
>
> K. T. HUTCHINSON,
>
> *Acting Secretary.*

I am glad to note that among others to benefit under the terms of the amendment are those farmers who grow 5 bales or less.

Again I assert for peanut quotas to endure, for cotton quotas to endure, they both must be fair to the family-size peanut or cotton farmer.

. . . . . .

Mr. MURRAY of Wisconsin. I thank the gentleman. I have introduced a bill to meet this situation. It provides for a 5-bale minimum for cotton and 500 bushels for wheat.

. . . . . .

The SPEAKER. The time of the gentleman from Texas has expired. All time has expired.

Without objection, the previous question is ordered.

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the conference report.

The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. FULTON) there were—ayes 175, noes 34.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

INDEX FOR JULY-DECEMBER, 1949

Volume CXII Numbers 1-6

SUBJECTS

Books in Brief:
July, 27; Aug., 87; Sept., 152; Oct., 215; Nov., 281; Dec., 332.

Congress Debates:
The International Wheat Agreement, July, 44;
The North Atlantic Treaty, Aug., 105;
The Minimum Wage, Sept., 169;
Pricing Practices, Oct., 232;
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, Nov., 296;
Farm Price Supports, Dec., 351.

Economics:
The Economic Basis of Southern Politics (III), July, 5;
Forum: Is Increased Foreign Trade Beneficial?, July, 36;
Congress Debates: The International Wheat Agreement, July, 44;
The Economic Basis of Southern Politics (IV), Aug., 83;
Forum: Do Export Controls Benefit the American Economy?, Aug., 96;
The Peasant in The Soviet Union, Sept., 148;
Forum: What Price Government Controls?, Sept., 160;
Congress Debates: The Minimum Wage, Sept., 169;
An International Economy?, Oct., 210;
Congress Debates: Pricing Practices, Oct., 232;
British Commonwealth in Crisis, Nov., 263;
Forum: Should the Coal Mines Be Nationalized?, Nov., 285;
Congress Debates: Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, Nov., 296;
Economics of the Welfare State, Dec., 328;
Congress Debates: Farm Price Supports, Dec., 351.

Forum:
Is Increased Foreign Trade Beneficial?, July, 36;
Do Export Controls Benefit the American Economy?, Aug., 96;
What Price Government Controls?, Sept., 160;
Should The President Be Elected by Direct Popular Vote?, Oct., 224;
Should the Coal Mines Be Nationalized?, Nov., 285;
Can Unification Work?, Dec., 341.

Informal Essays:
Country Comment, July, 31; Aug., 94; Sept., 151; Oct., 214; Nov., 284.

Labor:
Congress Debates: The Minimum Wage, Sept., 169;
Forum: Should the Coal Mines Be Nationalized?, Nov., 285.

More Than Fifty Years of Forum:
July, 42; Aug., 104; Sept., 168; Oct., 223.

Philosophy:
Definitions of Freedom, I. Locke vs. Hobbes, Aug., 65;
Definitions of Freedom, II. Jefferson vs. Robespierre, Sept., 129;
Definitions of Freedom, III. Marx vs. Schopenhauer, Oct., 193;
Definitions of Freedom, IV. The Webbs vs. Churchill, Nov., 257;
American Leadership (I), Dec., 321.

Poetry:
July, 43; Aug., 95; Sept., 155; Oct., 218; Nov., 280.

Politics:
International:
The Collapse of Fascism in Italy, July, 9;

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Congress Debates: The International Wheat Agreement, July, 44;
Soviet-German Collaboration, Aug., 73;
The Reporters View Germany, Aug., 77;
Congress Debates: The North Atlantic Treaty, Aug., 105;
German Nationalism, Sept., 136;
The Peasant in The Soviet Union, Sept., 148;
Problems in Understanding Russia, Oct., 200;
The Lost Peace of China, Oct., 205;
An International Economy?, Oct., 210;
British Commonwealth in Crisis, Nov., 263;
Money for Tito?, Nov., 272;
Britain's Course of Decline, Dec., 325;
American Leadership (I), Dec., 321.

The United States:

The Economic Basis of Southern Politics (III), July, 5;
Reform the Electoral College!, July, 18;
Revolution in Maine, July, 23;
The Economic Basis of Southern Politics (IV), Aug., 83;
The Popish Plot of 1928, Sept., 141;
Forum: What Price Government Controls?, Sept., 160;
Congress Debates: The Minimum Wage, Sept., 169;
Forum: Should The President Be Elected by Direct Popular Vote?, Oct., 224;
The Bridge of Fear, Nov., 267;
Forum: Should the Coal Mines Be Nationalized?, Nov., 285;
American Leadership (I), Dec., 321;
Forum: Can Unification Work?, Dec., 341.

Review of Books:

Alexander, Lloyd (Trans.): *Nausea,* (Jean-Paul Sartre), Aug., 89;
Arno, Peter: *Sizzling Platter,* Dec., 336;
Arnow, Harriet: *Hunter's Horn,* July, 29;
Asch, Sholem: *Mary,* Nov., 282;
Balchin, Nigel: *The Borgia Testament,* Sept., 153;
Bemis, Samuel Flagg: *John Quincy Adams,* Nov., 282;
Blum, Daniel (ed.): *Theatre World,* Dec., 335;
Bourke-White, Margaret: *Halfway to Freedom,* July, 30;
Burns, James M.: *Congress on Trial,* Nov., 283;
Busch, Noel F.: *Briton Hadden,* July, 28;
Caldwell, Taylor: *Let Love Come Last,* Sept., 154;
Callimachi, Anne-Marie: *Yesterday Was Mine,* July, 28;
Chase, Allan: *Shadow of a Hero,* July, 29;
Churchill, Winston S.: *The Sinews of Peace,* Aug., 88;
Clark, Marguerite: *Medicine on the March,* Aug., 88;
Costain, Thomas B.: *The Conquerors,* Dec., 335;
Counts, George S. and Lodge, Nucia: *The Country of the Blind,* Dec., 334;
Cousins, Norman (ed.): *Writing for Love or Money,* Sept., 154;
Cowles, Virginia: *No Cause for Alarm,* Dec., 334;
Davies, Blodwen: *Gaspé,* Aug., 88;
Day, A. Grove and Stroven, Carl (eds.): *The Spell of the Pacific,* July, 29;
Day, Donald: *The Autobiography of Will Rogers,* Dec., 334;
Dennis, Nigel: *A Sea Change,* Oct., 217;
Dessauer, Frederick E.: *Stability,* Aug., 87;
Dinneen, Joseph F.: *The Purple Shamrock,* Oct., 216;
Dobie, J. Frank: *The Voice of the Coyote,* July, 30;
Drooz, Irma Gross: *Doctor of Medicine,* July, 29;
Einstein, Albert: *The World As I See It,* Oct., 216;
Ellsberg, Edward: *No Banners, No Bugles,* Oct., 216;
Emmens, Lt. Col. Robert G.: *Guests of the Kremlin,* Dec., 335;
Esar, Evan: *The Dictionary of Humorous Quotations,* July, 30;
Feather, William: *The Business of Life,* Oct., 216;
Flesch, Rudolph: *The Art of Readable Writing,* Oct., 216;
Fosdick, Harry Emerson: *The Man from Nazareth,* Dec., 334;
Frank, Jerome: *Courts on Trial,* Nov., 281;
Gunther, John: *Behind the Curtain,* Sept., 154;
Guthrie, A. B.: *The Way West,* Nov., 283;

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Hadas, Moses (Trans.): *The Age of Constantine the Great* (Jacob Burckhardt), July, 28;
Hanford, James Holly: *John Milton, Englishman,* Dec., 334;
Hanna, Mark: *Public Speaking Without Fear and Trembling,* Dec., 335;
Harvey, Ruth: *Curtain Time,* Dec., 335;
Hedman, Martha: *Uncle, Aunt and Jezebel,* Dec., 336;
Hessler, William H.: *Operation Survival,* Dec., 334;
Hogben, Lancelot: *From Cave Painting to Comic Strip,* Dec., 335;
Hollingshead, A. B.: *Elmtown's Youth,* Sept., 152;
Howe, Irving and Widick, B. J.: *The U.A.W. and Walter Reuther,* Oct., 216;
Hungerford, Edward: *Wells Fargo,* Nov., 283;
Ilyin, Boris: *Green Boundary,* Nov., 283;
Ingalls, Fay: *The Valley Road,* July, 30;
Johnson, Gerald W.: *Our English Heritage,* Nov., 283;
Kasenkina, Oksana: *Leap to Freedom,* Dec., 334;
Katkov, Norman: *A Little Sleep, A Little Slumber,* Sept., 154;
Kaye-Smith, Sheila and Stern, G. B.: *More About Jane Austen,* Dec., 335;
Kelly, Judith: *A Diplomatic Incident,* Aug., 89;
Kerr, William C.: *Japan Begins Again,* Dec., 336;
Koestler, Arthur: *Promise and Fulfilment,* Dec., 335;
Kormendi, Ferenc: *The Happy Generation,* Oct., 217;
La Farge, Oliver: *The Eagle in the Egg,* Sept., 154;
Lampell, Millard: *The Hero,* Oct., 217;
Leighton, Isabel: *The Aspirin Age,* Aug., 89;
Lewis, Lloyd and Pargellis, Stanley (eds.): *Granger Country,* Aug., 89;
Lewis, Wyndham: *America and Cosmic Man,* July, 29;
Lilienthal, David E.: *This I Do Believe,* Dec., 334;
Lodge, Nucia and Counts, George S.: *The Country of the Blind,* Dec., 334;
London, Kurt: *How Foreign Policy is Made,* Aug., 88;
Mabie, Mary Louise: *Prepare Them for Caesar,* Aug., 89;
Maltz, Albert: *The Journey of Simon McKeever,* Aug., 89;
Manuel, Frank E.: *The Realities of American-Palestine Relations,* Aug., 88;
Marshall, Bruce: *To Every Man a Penny,* Dec., 336;
Maugham, W. Somerset: *A Writer's Notebook,* Dec., 335;
Mauldin, Bill: *A Sort of Saga,* Dec., 336;
McNickle, D'Arcy: *They Came Here First,* Aug., 88;
Meigs, Cornelia: *The Violent Men,* July, 28;
Mitchell, Edwin Valentine: *It's an Old Cape Cod Custom,* July, 30;
Mitchell, Edwin Valentine: *It's an Old State of Maine Custom,* Aug., 88;
Moldenke, Harold N.: *American Wild Flowers,* Sept., 154;
Moley, Raymond: *27 Masters of Politics,* Dec., 333;
Morgan, Charles: *The River Line,* Sept., 154;
Morley, Christopher: *The Man Who Made Friends With Himself,* July, 29;
Morris, Joe Alex and Smith, Ira R. T.: *"Dear Mr. President",* Dec., 336;
Musselman, M. M.: *I Married a Redhead,* Nov., 283;
Myers, John Myers: *Silverlock,* Dec., 336;
Nemerov, Howard: *The Melodramatists,* July, 29;
Nicholas, Edward: *The Hours and Ages,* Nov., 283;
North, Robert Carver: *Revolt in San Marcos,* Oct., 217;
O'Faolian, Sean: *The Irish,* Nov., 282;
O'Hara, John: *A Rage to Live,* Nov., 283;
Opdycke, John Baker: *Mark My Words,* Aug., 89;
Pargellis, Stanley and Lewis, Lloyd (eds.): *Granger Country,* Aug., 89;
Peattie, Donald Culross, *American Heartwood,* Dec., 335;
Pei, Mario: *The Story of Language,* Dec., 334;
Perry, Ralph Barton: *Characteristically American,* Oct., 215;
Plenn, Abel: *Upon This Continent,* July, 29;

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Powers, Alfred: *Redwood Country,* Dec., 335;
Putnam, George Palmer: *Hickory Shirt,* Sept., 153;
Rogers, Agnes: *Women Are Here to Stay,* Oct., 217;
Roosevelt, Eleanor: *This I Remember,* Dec., 334;
Russell, Bertrand: *Authority and the Individual,* Dec., 332;
Russell, William: *The Bolivar Countries, Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela,* Sept., 154;
Sabatini, Rafael: *The Gamester,* Oct., 217;
Salter, Andrew: *Conditioned Reflex Therapy,* Dec., 335;
Sheean, Vincent: *Lead, Kindly Light,* Dec., 336;
Sinclair, Upton: *O Shepherd Speak!,* Sept., 153;
Smith, Ira R. T. and Morris, Joe Alex: *"Dear Mr. President",* Dec., 336;
Smith, Nicol: *Golden Doorway To Thibet,* Aug., 88;
Sokoloff, Boris, M.D.: *The Miracle Drugs,* Oct., 216;
Standish, Robert: *Elephant Walk,* Aug., 89;
Stannard, Harold: *The Two Constitutions,* Aug., 88;
Starkey, Marion L.: *The Devil in Mass,* Nov., 283;
Steen, Marguerite: *Twilight on the Floods,* Sept., 153;
Stein, Jess: *American Everyday Dictionary,* Oct., 217;
Stern, G. B. and Kaye-Smith, Sheila: *More About Jane Austen,* Dec., 335;
Stowe, Leland: *Target: You,* July, 28;
Stroven, Carl and Day, A. Grove (eds.): *The Spell of the Pacific,* July, 29;
Taylor, Deems: *Music to My Ears,* July, 30;
Trevelyan, G. M.: *An Autobiography and Other Essays,* Nov., 282;
Tully, Grace: *F.D.R., My Boss,* Nov., 282;
Udin, Sophie A. (ed.): *The Palestine Year Book and Israeli Annual,* Vol. IV, Sept., 154;
Underwood, Agnes: *Newspaperwoman,* Aug., 88;
Viereck, Peter: *Conservatism Revisited,* Dec., 334;
Villiers, Alan: *The Coral Sea,* July, 28;
Waltari, Mika: *The Egyptian,* Sept., 153;
Warburg, James P.: *Last Call for Common Sense,* July, 27;
Warner, W. Lloyd (ed.): *Democracy in Jonesville,* Sept., 152;
Wasserman, Jakob: *Alexander in Babylon,* July, 29;
Westwood, Horace, D.D.: *There is a Psychic World,* Dec., 336;
Wheelwright, Jere: *The Wolfshead,* Oct., 217;
White, Leslie T.: *Lord Johnnie,* July, 29;
Wickendon, Leonard: *Make Friends With Your Land,* Dec., 335;
Widick, B. J. and Howe, Irving: *The U.A.W. and Walter Reuther,* Oct., 216;
Wight, Frederick: *Inner Harbor,* Aug., 89;
Williams, Ben Ames: *Fraternity Village,* Sept., 154.

Theatre Arts, The:
July, 32; Aug., 90; Sept., 156; Oct., 219; Nov., 275; Dec., 337.

AUTHORS

Abbagnano, Marian Taylor:
The Collapse of Fascism in Italy, July, 9.
Allen, Lafe Franklin:
Reform The Electoral College!, July, 18.
Andrews, John B.:
Forum: Should The President Be Elected by Direct Popular Vote?, Oct., 224.
Brown, Thomas J.:
Forum: Should The President Be Elected by Direct Popular Vote?, Oct., 225.
Bryner, Cyril:
The Peasant in The Soviet Union, Sept., 148.
Carlton, William G.:
The Popish Plot of 1928, Sept., 141.
Clark, Thomas D.:
The Economic Basis of Southern Politics, (III), July, 5;
(IV), Aug., 83.
Coffin, Robert P. Tristram:
Poetry, Sept., 155.
Comstock, Alzada:
British Commonwealth in Crisis, Nov., 263.
Cowherd, Raymond G.:
Britain's Course of Decline, Dec., 325.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Cramer, Frederick H.:
Definitions of Freedom, I. Locke vs. Hobbes, Aug., 65;
II. Jefferson vs. Robespierre, Sept., 129;
III. Marx vs. Schopenhaur, Oct., 193;
IV. The Webbs vs. Churchill, Nov., 257.

de Rycke, Laurence:
An International Economy?, Oct., 210;
Economics of the Welfare State, Dec., 328.

Ellis, Ellen D.:
Man vs. Bureaucracy, (III), July, 1;
American Leadership, (I), Dec., 321.

Francis, Robert:
Country Comment, July 31; Aug., 94; Sept., 151; Oct., 214; Nov., 284;
Poetry, Aug., 95; Oct., 218; Nov., 280.

French, Inez:
Forum: Do Export Controls Benefit the American Economy?, Aug., 96.

Gassner, John:
The Theatre Arts, July, 32; Aug., 90; Sept., 156; Oct., 219; Nov., 275; Dec., 337.

Graham, David L.:
Revolution in Maine, July, 23.

Hermens, Ferdinand A.:
The Reporters View Germany, Aug., 77;
German Nationalism, Sept., 136.

Lewis, Jasper R.:
Books in Brief, July, 27; Aug., 87; Sept., 152; Oct., 215; Nov., 281; Dec., 332.

Morton, David:
Poetry, July, 43.

Park, No-yong:
The Lost Peace of China, Oct., 205.

Riggs, Arthur Stanley:
The Bridge of Fear, Nov., 267.

Thompson, Carol L.:
Forum: Is Increased Foreign Trade Beneficial?, July, 36;
Forum: What Price Government Controls?, Sept., 160;
Forum: Should Our Coal Mines Be Nationalized?, Nov., 285;
Forum: Can Unification Work?, Dec., 341.

Towster, Julian:
Problems in Understanding Russia, Oct., 200.

Viereck, Peter:
Soviet-German Collaboration, Aug., 73.

Williams, Joseph C.:
Forum: Do Export Controls Benefit the American Economy?, Aug., 96.

Xydis, Stephen G.:
Money for Tito?, Nov., 272.

A man stood on the street corner waiting to cross, while traffic streamed by swift and continuous. After a long wait, the man became impatient, but he dared not risk going out into the traffic. He spied another man on the other side of the street and called to him: "I say, how did you get over there?"

The other man cupped his hands about his mouth and shouted: "I was born over here."—*Classmate*

At the first United Nations Scientific Conference on the Conservation and Utilization of Resources, Y. M. Simaika, deputy inspector general of Egypt's Nile Control Department, presented a paper on Egypt's plans to harness the Nile. The delegate emphasized the importance of accurately predicting the Nile's water levels to avert flood disasters. He revealed that the search for safe advance polling has produced one unique system based upon a connection between such distant phenomena as the Nile flood, the temperature of Dutch Harbor in Alaska, the temperature in Samoa, and the pressure at Port Darien, Australia. However, he added that this approach has "not up to the present attained sufficient accuracy to be of practical use."—*The New York Times*

DRURY COLLEGE LIBRARY
Springfield, Missouri

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED